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Abstract 
No definite conclusions have been drawn regarding the impact of political democracy on 
economic growth in spite of a plethora of theoretical and empirical studies. This study tries to 
explain the inconclusive relationship and overcome it if possible by the use of a quantitative 
assessment of the democracy-growth literature following the work published by Doucouliagos 
and Ulubasoglu in 2008. It applies meta-regression analysis to the population of 1221 estimates 
derived from 110 studies on democracy and economic growth. Using traditional meta-analysis 
estimators, publication selection bias tests, and Fixed and Random Effects meta-regression 
models, it derives some robust conclusions. Taking all the available published evidence together, 
it concludes that democracy has a zero direct impact on economic growth. However, democracy 
has robust, significant, and positive indirect effects through higher levels of economic freedom 
whereas it has robust, significant, and negative indirect effects through higher levels of income 
inequality. Democracies may also be associated with larger governments and less free 
international trade. There also appear to be country- and region-specific democracy-growth 
effects. Overall, democracy’s net effect on the economy is minimal and not detrimental. 
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1. Introduction                                                                                         
Economists have been trying to determine the linkages between political democracy and 
economic growth for more than 50 years. A multitude of cross-country research studies have not 
been able to bridge the theoretical divide on the impact of democratic versus authoritarian 
regimes on economic growth since their empirical results are ambiguous at best, resulting in a 
general agreement among economists of an inconclusive relationship. This paper tries to come to 
a firm and robust conclusion about the relationship of democracy and economic growth. It builds 
on the previous work done by H. Doucouliagos and M.A. Ulubasoglu1 who have shown that a 
meta-analytic approach to the investigation of the primary studies is possible to help us come to 
several stable and strong conclusions regarding the relationship between democracy and 
economic growth. 
Proponents of the “democracy-led growth” hypothesis argue that the desire of people to 
work and invest, the effective allocation of resources in the marketplace, and profit-maximizing 
private enterprise can all be sustained in a climate of political freedom, free-flowing information, 
and protected private property rights (North 1990). Democracies can control government 
intervention in the economy; are responsive to public concerns on areas such as education, 
justice, and health; and promote stable and long-run growth (Baum and Lake 2003; Lake and 
Baum 2001; Rodrik 1998). Opponents of this hypothesis, on the other hand, argue that 
democracies are prone to succumb to popular demands for immediate consumption at the 
expense of profitable investments, cannot be protected from the interests of rent seekers, and 
cannot organize the resources of the economy quickly. Democracies are also blamed for conflicts 
due to social, ethnic, and class struggles. While some authors favor authoritarian regimes to take 
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all measures necessary for rapid growth, others remain overall skeptical on whether political 
regimes, rather than markets and institutions, matter for growth (Bhagwati 1995). 
The availability of useful data and an increasing number of efficient econometric 
techniques have given researchers the ability to study this hypothesis. The empirical findings, 
however, stretch over a continuum of negative, insignificant, and positive estimates, creating a 
puzzle as to the true relationship of democracy to economic growth. For example, the distribution 
of results that Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu have compiled from 483 regression estimates from 
84 published democracy-growth studies shows that 15% of the estimates are negative and 
statistically significant, 21% of the estimates are negative and statistically insignificant, 37% of 
the estimates are positive and statistically insignificant, and 27% of the estimates are positive and 
statistically significant. This implies that nearly three-quarters of the regressions have not been 
able to find the “desired” positive and significant sign for the impact of democracy on growth. It 
also implies that around half of the regression models have found statistically significant 
estimates while the other half found statistically insignificant ones. Such different results are not 
unanticipated because the research questions asked are understandably narrow and approach the 
issue from different angles. For example, while some primary studies focus on the physical 
investment channel between democracy and growth, others look at the human capital or political 
instability channels. In like manner, some primary studies present structural estimates of a well-
defined model, whereas others focus on empirical uniformities in the data. Thus, the question is 
perplexed with a continuum of estimates, which vary due to data sources, estimation techniques, 
sample compositions, and time periods2. 
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This paper presents a meta-analysis on the democracy-growth relationship, based on 110 
published studies. It follows the work published by H. Doucouliagos and M.A. Ulubasoglu in 
2008. It contributes 35 new primary studies to 75 out of the 84 primary studies that H. 
Doucouliagos and M.A. Ulubasoglu used in their work. More importantly due to the abundance 
of the data in the new studies it uses 1221 regression estimates in order to study the effect size 
and direction of democracy on economic growth, thus increasing its accuracy and precision. First, 
it offers a complete assessment of the democracy-growth findings based on the entire pool of 
estimates in the published literature. Second, the quantitative assessment is used to come to 
strong conclusions on the magnitude and the significance of the democracy-growth relationship. 
Third, it investigates the factors driving the heterogeneity of the results that have been noted by 
individual studies.  
Meta-regression analysis (MRA) is the systematic review and quantitative synthesis of 
empirical economic evidence on a given hypothesis, phenomenon, or effect. MRA is a type of 
meta-analysis that is explicitly designed to integrate econometric estimates, typically regression 
coefficients or transformations of regression coefficients; in our case partial correlations3. It 
seeks both to summarize and to explain the wide, often disparate, variation routinely found 
among reported econometric results. Although guidelines for conducting and reporting meta-
analyses have been offered before (Higgins and Green, 2008; Stroup et al., 2008), none have 
explicitly considered the type of empirical evidence typically found in applied econometric 
research. Moreover, existing MRA guidelines in the economics literature focus primarily on 
methodological aspects of econometric estimation and interpretation (e.g., Nelson and Kennedy, 
2009), rather than on broader standards of MRA practice and reporting. Because MRA is widely 
accepted throughout the scientific literature, and in order to safeguard the validity and 
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replicability of our results we comply with the reporting protocols that were put forth by the 
members of the Meta-Analysis of Economics Research Network (MAER-Net) as explained in 
the Technical Appendix of this paper. 
Meta-analysis assumes that each study is a data point in the knowledge-generating structure 
towards the true democracy-growth relationship and that it may show some random or systematic 
variations from the true relationship. An important factor for such variation is sampling error. At 
the level of an individual study, sampling error is a random and unknown event, which can make 
empirical results seem to be more different than they may in fact be. However, by examining all 
studies together, meta-analysis informs on the magnitude of sampling error and facilitates 
discarding these effects from empirical findings (Hunter and Schmidt 2004)4. 
Another factor is research design. Studies convey diverse results due to differences in 
econometric specifications, country composition of samples, time periods, control variables, and 
estimation techniques. Meta-analysis can, among other things, help clear away such differences 
across studies, estimate their significance, and direct future research towards less biased studies5. 
Once sampling error and research design differences are removed, meta-analysis supports 
examination of whether there is a latent relationship between democracy and growth. If there is a 
relationship, is it positive or negative, and does it vary across countries, regions, or time periods? 
Meta-analysis is also very useful for extracting important information on the indirect effects of 
democracy on growth. Capital formation, income inequality, political stability, price stability, 
and the size of government determine important structural differences among countries and 
influence long-run growth. Meta-analysis facilitates the statistical investigation of the 
relationships between democracy and these factors in a unified schema. 
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This paper supports the main conclusion of the previous work done by H. Doucouliagos 
and M.A. Ulubasoglu but with a caveat. It finds that once all the available evidence is 
considered, including all of the 1221 regression estimates of the effect size, the evidence does not 
point to democracy having a harmful influence on growth. Furthermore, we are able to conclude 
that the effect is not inconclusive. There is, in fact, a zero direct effect of democracy on growth. 
However, the results from the primary studies are highly heterogeneous with a lot of unexplained 
variance that cannot be attributed simply to sampling error or research design differences like 
Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu do. The results are suggestive of region-specific effects on the 
democracy-growth relationship. Specifically, the direction of the growth effect of democracy 
appears to be positive in Latin America and negative in Africa and Asia while it is strong and 
negative in the developed countries. There are also other interesting indirect effects that emerge 
from the results that need to be further studied and analyzed before a definite and reliable 
conclusion is reached. 
The paper is structured as follows. The second section provides a detailed literature review 
presenting the key theoretical arguments behind the democracy-growth relationship, and the next 
section discusses the meta-analysis methodology adopted in this paper. The fourth section 
discusses the data used. The fifth section is the heart of this paper, presenting meta-analysis and 
meta-regression analysis results. The sixth section concludes the paper with suggestions for 
further analysis of the current data set. The seventh section is an appendix-glossary of the 
variables used in the primary studies included in the meta-analysis. The eighth section is a 
technical appendix detailing the protocols followed in the research, coding and analysis process. 
The ninth section includes all the notes made throughout the paper and the final tenth section a 
list of all the references used in the research process.  
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Democracy-led growth hypothesis 
Does political democracy cause economic growth? This is the question that needs to be answered 
for the democracy-led growth hypothesis to be resolved. Political regimes based on degree of 
democracy influence the economic growth of a market economy through the following channels; 
physical capital accumulation from internal and external sources, social and political stability, 
good governance, and political continuity. 
 We define physical capital accumulation from internal sources as saving, consumption 
and investment by local economic actors. A liberal democracy is concerned for the social welfare 
of the people and thus induces public and private spending on consumption for maintaining a 
satisfactory standard of living for its citizens. This usually leads to a decrease of national saving 
and investment. The economy fails to accumulate the physical capital, which is the foundation 
for economic growth at the initial stages of economic development. Politicians in a democratic 
welfare state ignore the necessary expenditures on the quality of highways, railroads, harbors, 
airports, large scale farming and industry. Instead, they are very eager to provide social services 
in the name of human development such as free education, health care, social security, fiscal 
subsidies and transfers, land distribution etc. Even these types of services contribute to economic 
development in the long run; superficial as it may be. Welfarism does not have direct linkage 
with human capital development which is needed in order to promote economic growth. Political 
freedom and democracy may undermine the effectiveness of government in maintaining fiscal 
discipline as well as law and order. Democratic regimes in LDC’s6 promote consumption at the 
cost of saving.  In contrast, authoritarian governments are said to limit consumption, increasing 
national savings, and thereby promoting economic growth. 
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 We define physical capital accumulation from external sources as foreign aid, FDI7 & 
technology, and other external financial sources. Countries try to attract financial resources from 
external sources for physical capital accumulation. These sources are encouraged to invest in a 
country based on the stability and economic predictability that its political system can provide.  
 Social and political stability is another factor that promotes economic growth. The 
question is the degree to which a democracy is linked to social and political stability. Even within 
democratic regimes there are notable differences. Liberal democracies in well-developed and 
advanced industrial nations are more likely to exhibit permanent characteristics of social and 
political stability compared to their less developed counterparts. 
 Good governance is usually defined as the maintenance of roles and regulation, and 
lowering of the corruption. Political freedom and democratic government in developing countries 
are likely to lead to government corruption and bribery among the politicians and the bureaucrats. 
Democratic regimes seem to retard growth by promoting rent seeking, activities of pressure or 
interest groups whose primary goal is to grab the major share of the nation’s economic pie. 
Democratic governments encourage trade and labor unions to demand unduly high wages, which 
leads to strikes and lockouts and the consequent loss of national output.    
Political continuity usually leads to policy continuity and growth. As we know the 
outcomes of economic policies are received by an economy in the long run. In liberal democratic 
regimes government changes are frequent and economic policies also change quite frequently. 
Discontinuity of economic policy adversely affects economic growth. 
 What are some of the reasons that democratic regimes may be considered good for 
economic growth? First of all, only governments with some legitimacy will be able to implement 
and sustain policies that may bear high short-term costs. Secondly, several of the institutional 
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characteristics of a democracy, like an independent legal system, are also required for a 
successful economic liberalization. As North (1993) puts it, “well specified and enforced 
property rights, a necessary condition for economic growth, are only secure when political and 
civil rights are secure; otherwise arbitrary confiscation is always a threat”. Finally, 
democratization may limit rent-seeking due to its system of checks and balances. Recently, 
Rodrik (2000) has argued that democratic institutions - political parties, elected representatives, 
free speech, and the like - can be viewed as the ultimate institutions of conflict management, as 
they allow for differences among social groups to be resolved in a predictable, inclusive, and 
participatory manner. But, democratic regimes may lead to policies that hamper economic 
growth (rich-to-poor redistribution, large public sector, high taxes) due to majority voting. 
Influence of interest groups (Olson) will reduce the flexibility of the economy. 
What are some of the reasons that authoritarian regimes may be considered good for 
economic growth? First of all, only an authoritarian government is in a position to introduce 
unpopular measures; electorates often turn down economic reform even when it is known in the 
end that they would benefit a majority of voters. Policies that would be popular ex post are often 
not implemented in a democratic regime. Secondly, the demand for comprehensive state action 
requires the presence of a strong state: there has been no case of successful economic 
development during the previous century without comprehensive political action, involving 
massive state intervention in the economy. Finally, supporters of this view often refer to the 
experience of countries such as Chile, South Korea and Taiwan. But, Dictators may also be 
forced to follow opportunistic policies if their survival in office is threatened. Authoritarian 
regimes are not homogeneous. While the apparent association of high economic growth with 
authoritarian regimes is suggested by the experience of several non-democratic “technocratic” 
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regimes (such as those in South-Korea and Taiwan), it is at the same time evident that there are 
many counter examples of “kleptocratic” and/or inept authoritarian regimes whose rule has led to 
slow  economic growth rates. Authoritarian rule can mean arbitrary rule and undue interference, 
which may hinder economic growth. A strong state and an authoritarian state are not necessarily 
the same thing. 
 
2.2 Proponents of the democracy-led growth hypothesis  
The relationship between political factors and economic growth has come to light by the work of 
Lipset in 1959. His study examined how economic development is delayed by political regimes. 
Since then, the political environment has been thought to play an important role in economic 
growth. Dick (1974) in a cross-country analysis with regard to the effect of democracy, autocracy 
and bureaucracy on growth in 59 underdeveloped countries during the period of 1959-1968 
comes to a conclusion that democracy has a positive effect on growth. Kormendi and Meguire 
(1985) in a cross-country analysis about the effect of democracy, autocracy and bureaucracy on 
growth in 47 countries during the period of 1950-1977 conclude that democracy caused an 
increase in the rate of economic growth. 
 Scully (1988, 1992),  Remmer (1990) and Barro (1989)  in cross-country studies about 
the effect of democracy, autocracy and bureaucracy on growth in 115 countries during 1960-
1980, 11 Latin American countries during 1982-1988, and in 72 countries during 1960-1985  
conclude that democracy increased the rate of economic growth at a faster pace than normal. 
Grier and Tullock (1989) show the different effect of democracy on growth in different regions. 
In a cross-country analysis of the effect of democracy, autocracy and bureaucracy on growth in 
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59 countries during 1961 -1980, they show that the effect of democracy on growth was more 
pronounced in Africa and no regime difference had any impact on growth in Latin America.  
 Dani Rodrik (1997) in a cross-country analysis by using a democracy index in 100 
countries during 1970 -1994 demonstrates that democracy affects economic performance 
positively. 
 Gupta K.D, Madhavan M.C, and Andrew B. (1998) with pooled time series cross-country 
analysis during 1965-1986,  three 7 year-periods 1965-71, 1972-79 and 1980-86 in 120 countries 
by using an index of political freedom and an index of democracy with political instability 
measures show that democracy affects economic growth positively. 
 Panther (1999) by using factor analytic methods, a Civic-ness indicator is extracted for 11 
economies in transition that reflects trust in impersonal institutions and the attractiveness of non- 
democratic regimes to democratic government show that Civic-ness promotes both liberal-
democratic institutional reforms and economic performance.   
 Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr (2001) with  a qualitative approach to growth theory by using 
theories of growth with mathematical treatment illustrates that politics, policies and institutions 
affect the input factors of an economy and the marginal productivities, hence output and growth.  
 John C.Bluedorn (2001) with pooled decadal data analysis in 60 countries during the 
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s by using democracy measures explains that democratic institutions have 
a positive influence on growth. However, democracies in homogeneous ethnic nations negatively 
affect economic growth.  
Ludovic and Comeau (2003) in a cross-sectional analysis by using five political variables 
including initial democratic capital as a proxy for sociopolitical instability (standard deviation of   
political rights index means absence of stability) in 82 countries during1979-1989 show that 
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democratic types of political regimes are more favorable to economic prosperity, and that a non-
linear relationship exists between growth and regime type.  They also show that sociopolitical 
stability which is achieved by democratic regimes most likely is a necessary complementary 
condition for economic growth.  
James L. Butkiewicz and Halit Yanikkaya (2006) in a cross-country analysis by using 
measures of political and institutional variables in 100 countries conclude that the rule of law and 
democratic institutions promote economic growth.    
 
2.3 Opponents of the democracy-led growth hypothesis 
At the most basic form, political instability caused by democracy, bureaucracies or autocracies 
would increase the political uncertainty, discouraging investment and eventually hindering 
economic growth.   Przeworksi (1966) in a cross-country analysis of the effect of democracy, 
autocracy and bureaucracy on growth in 57 countries during 1949-1963 concludes that 
dictatorships in countries at medium development level help grow the economy faster than 
democracies. Adelman and Morris (1967) in a cross-country analysis of the effect of democracy, 
autocracy and bureaucracy on growth in 74 underdeveloped countries (including the communist 
bloc) during 1950 -1968 affirm that authoritarianism helped to increase growth in less and 
medium developed countries. Marsh (1979) in a cross- country analysis of the effect of 
democracy, autocracy and bureaucracy on growth in 98 countries during 1950-1970 concludes 
that authoritarian regimes helped the economy grow faster. Weede (1983) in a cross-country 
analysis of the effect of democracy, autocracy and bureaucracy on growth in124 countries during 
1960-1974 shows also that authoritarian regimes helped the economy grow faster. Finally, 
Landau (1986) in a cross-country analysis of the effect of democracy, autocracy and bureaucracy 
Kyriakos J. Xafis 
15 
 
on growth in 65 countries during 1960-1980 shows that authoritarian regimes increased the rate 
of economic growth in their economies. 
 Some studies have not reached a definite conclusion whether democracy affects growth or 
not. For example, Kohli (1986) in a cross-country analysis of the effect of democracy, autocracy 
and bureaucracy on growth in 10 underdeveloped countries during 1960-1982 comes to a 
conclusion that there was no difference in the 1960s, but authoritarian regimes were slightly 
better in the 1970s.   
 Pourgerami (1991) with evidence from 106 less developed countries shows that 
democracy decreased the rate of growth. Helliwell (1992) in a cross-country regression analysis 
of the effect of democracy, autocracy and bureaucracy on growth in 90 countries during 1960-
1985 shows that democracy has a negative but statistically insignificant effect on growth. 
 Nelson  M.A and Ram D. Singh (1998) in a study of 67 developing countries with cross- 
sectional analysis for the period of 1970-1989 with sub-divisions of 1970-1974, 1975-1979, 
1980-1984 and 1985-1989 explain that economic freedom, not political freedom or democracy is 
relevant for growth in developing countries. South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore are cited in 
support of such contentions. There is no evidence that democracy, political and civil liberties are 
detrimental to growth.  
 Hamid Mohtadi and Terry L Roe (2003) in a two-sector endogenous growth model by 
following a mathematical approach show that higher democracy is associated with higher 
corruption (rent seeking) and higher corruption leads to low growth. Albert Saiz (2006) in a 
cross- country analysis by regressing a democracy index on the quantity and quality of roads in 
75 countries illustrates that dictatorships have roads of a higher quality and quantity than 
democratic regimes. Since highways are part of the economic infrastructure, dictatorships 
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positively affect economic growth. Democracy negatively affects economic growth. 
Selvarathnam Santhirasegaram (2007) in a cross-country analysis by regressing a democratic 
index on economic growth in 70 developing countries during 2000-2005 concludes that 
democracy in developing countries affects economic growth negatively. 
 Acemoglu D. et al (2008) reject that democratic societies are usually associated with a 
higher level of economic development than non-democratic societies. They argue that there is a 
two-way relationship between democracy and economic development. On the one hand, 
democracy has linkages to economic development; on the other hand, economic development 
leads to democratization. It is difficult to conclude that democracy promotes economic growth. 
Success of economic development concerning political regimes depends not only on democratic 
freedom but also on other socio-political factors such as leadership, mentality of people, history 
of a nation, international political environment, regional political environment, role of religion in 
politics, role of language policies, ethnic homogeneity, cast system, gender equality, 
colonization, and nature of independence etc.                                                                                 
 
2.4 Studies testing the democracy-led growth hypothesis 
Below is a table listing all of the primary studies that tested the democracy-led growth hypothesis 
either directly or indirectly and that are included in the meta-analysis study presented in this 
paper. 
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Table 1: Literature review of studies concerning Democracy & Economic Growth 
 
Index Authors Countries Period Method Variables Empirical Results 
1. T. Masaki  
& 
 N. van de Walle 
(2014) 
43 countries  
(SSA8) 
(annual data) 
1982-2012 Sequential estimation of 10 different 
specifications of a standard growth 
model controlling for several 
variables: 
POLS9, RE-GLS10 & FE-OLS11 
GDP p.c.12 Growth(%), (WDI13), 
(PWT14), (Maddison), GDP p.c. 
(US$2000), Democracy level, 
Transition/interregnum, Democracy 
duration, FDI (% of GDP), 
Inflation, Terms of trade change (%), 
Life expectancy, Government 
consumption (% of GDP), Trade 
openness (% of GDP), Oil and gas 
production (% of GDP), Political 
violence, Former British colony, Former 
French colony, ELF15, Landlock, 
Tropical, Aid/GNI16 (%), Country 
Dummies, Year Dummies 
Strong evidence 
found that 
democracy is 
positively associated 
with economic 
growth more so for 
countries that have 
remained democratic 
for longer periods of 
time. 
2. H. Rachdi  
& 
 H. Saidi 
(2015) 
17 countries 
( MENA17 ) 
(annual data) 
1983-2012 Estimation of 5 different  
specifications of a standard growth 
model  controlling for several 
variables: 
RE-GLS, FE-OLS & GMM18 in 
system approach 
Avg.19 Annual GDP p.c. Growth (%), 
Inflation, Trade openness (% of GDP), 
Government consumption (% of GDP), 
Population Growth Rate, Democracy 
Score,  Xrconst Autocracy Score, 
Xrcomp, Xropen 
Strong evidence 
found that 
democracy has a 
robust negative 
impact on economic 
growth. 
3.  B.A. Fida  
&  
M. Zakaria 
(2011) 
1 country 
(Pakistan)  
(annual data) 
1947-2006 Time series data  regression analysis 
and estimation of 22 different  
specifications of a standard growth 
model  controlling for several 
variables: GMM Arellano and Bond 
estimation technique used to 
overcome endogeneity and omitted 
variable problems as well as AR 
process is applied to remove 
autocorrelation from the model 
Avg. Annual RGDP20 p.c. Growth (%), 
Democracy index, Political Constraint, Ln 
Capital stock per worker,  Ln Human 
capital, Democracy Dummy, Ln 
Government consumption(% of RGDP), 
Trade openness(% of NGDP21), Inflation 
rate, Ln Oil prices 
Empirical results 
show that 
democracy has weak 
negative effects on 
economic growth in 
Pakistan and it is 
also found to have 
indirect effects on 
economic growth. 
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Table 1 continued: Literature review of studies concerning Democracy & Economic Growth 
Index Authors Countries Period Method Variables Empirical Results 
4. R.J. Barro 
(1996) 
100 countries 
(annual data) 
1960-1990 IV22 Panel Regression Data 
Analysis run on several 
specifications of a basic 
neoclassical growth model 
in 3 separate equations for 3 
different time periods, 
estimation method 3SLS23 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), 
Ln(GDP) initial level, Male 
Schooling, Female Schooling, Ln(life 
expectancy), Ln(GDP)*human 
capital, Ln(fertility rate) Government 
consumption ratio, Public educational 
spending ratio, Black Market 
Premium, Rule of Law Index, Terms-
of-trade change, Investment ratio, 
Democracy Index, Democracy index 
squared, Democracy index dummy 
for (0, .33), Democracy index 
dummy for (.33, .67) 
Once the favorable effects on growth 
including maintenance of the rule of 
law, free markets, small government 
consumption, and high human capital 
and the initial level of real per capita 
GDP are held constant, the overall 
effect of democracy on growth is 
weakly negative. There is a suggestion 
of a nonlinear relationship in which 
more democracy enhances growth at 
low levels of political freedom but 
depresses growth when a moderate 
level of freedom has already been 
attained. 
5. J. Tavares,  
& 
R. Wacziarg 
(2001) 
65 countries 
(5-year 
averages data) 
1970-1989 Panel data and SEM24: The 
basic econometric 
specification consists of a 
series of eight structural 
relationships describing the 
behavior of the endogenous 
variables. The model 
consists of a cross-country 
growth equation and seven 
channel equations, one for 
each of the channel 
variables 
Estimation methods: 3SLS, 
IV-GLS,SUR25,SE-FE 
Within 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%) 
PPP26 adjusted, Democracy Index, 
Ln initial income, Investment rate 
(%),Human capital, Gini coefficient 
(%),Political instability, Black 
market premium, Trade share (% 
GDP),Government consumption (% 
GDP), Inflation rate (%),Terms of 
Trade, Religious Dummies, Oil 
Exporter Dummy, Postwar 
Independence Dummy, Colony 
Dummy, Log Area, Log Distance, 
Landlock Dummy, Population under 
15, Population over 65, ELF 
 
Results suggest that democracy fosters 
growth by improving the accumulation 
of human capital and, less robustly, by 
lowering income inequality. On the 
other hand, democracy hinders growth 
by reducing the rate of physical capital 
accumulation and, less robustly, by 
raising the ratio of government 
consumption to GDP. Once all of 
these indirect effects are accounted 
for, the overall effect of democracy on 
economic growth is moderately 
negative. 
6. M.G. Qureshi 
& 
E. Ahmed 
(2012) 
73 countries 
(annual data) 
1987-2002 Dynamic simultaneous 
equation framework that 
combines in a system the 
regression in differences 
with regression in levels 
applied on a cross country 
data set. GMM method of 
estimation 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), 
Capital stock p.c., Democracy index, 
Ratio of sum of exports and imports 
to GDP (%), Gross secondary 
enrolment ratio (%), Life expectancy 
at birth (years) 
There is evidence for a quadratic 
impact of democracy on per capita 
GDP growth (inverted U relation), that 
is per capita GDP is found to be 
increasing in democracies at low 
levels but after a certain moderate 
level of democracy this relation turns 
negative. 
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Table 1 continued: Literature review of studies concerning Democracy & Economic Growth 
Index Authors Countries Period Method Variables Empirical Results 
7. J. Gerring,  
P. Bond,  
W. T. Barndt, 
and C. Moreno 
(2005) 
180  
countries 
(annual data) 
1900-2000 Estimation of 31 different 
specifications based on a standard 
growth model controlling for 
several variables: Pooled cross-
country - time-series and panel data 
analysis- OLS with FE and AR27(1) 
disturbance 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), 
Democracy stock (1900–), 
Democracy level, GDP p.c. (ln), 
Inflation (ln), Investment (PWT), 
Instability (Banks), Trade openness 
(PWT), Life expectancy (WDI), Oil 
shock (dummy), Growth p.c. (trade-
weighted), Population growth (WDI), 
Years independent, Regime durability 
(Polity IV), Social conflict (Marshall), 
Government consumption (PWT), 
Illiteracy (ln) 
 
Democracy when measured 
as a level variable has no 
statistically significant effect 
on economic growth 
whereas democracy when 
measured as a stock variable 
has a highly significant 
positive growth effect. 
Long-term democracy leads 
to stronger economic 
performance. 
8. E. Weede 
(1997) 
48  
countries 
(annual data) 
1960-1985 Basic regression analysis with OLS 
estimation 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%),  
RGDP p.c. initial level, Democracy, 
Primary School Enrollment, 
Agricultural labor, Top 20% income 
share, Middle 20% income share, 
Low 40% income share, Gini land 
ownership, Middle 20% times 
democracy, Gini land times democracy 
 
 
 
 
It is questionable whether 
equality effects on growth 
apply only within 
democracies, as a median 
voter interpretation of this 
relationship should make 
one expect. The general idea 
that distributional struggle 
hurts the growth prospects 
of nations, however, 
receives some empirical 
support. 
9. T. Persson 
& 
G. Tabellini 
(2006) 
150 countries 
(annual data) 
1960-2000 Panel OLS Regression Data 
Analysis-FE both country and year. 
Estimation by difference in 
differences, where countries 
changing regime are the “treated” 
and those that do not are the 
“controls.” 
GDP p.c. Growth (%)  (PWT), 
Democracy dummy, Liberalization, 
Democracy after liberalization, 
Liberalization after democracy, 
Parliamentary democracy, Presidential 
democracy, Hazard rate out of current 
regime, Prob28. of autocracy, Prob.of 
autocracy in lagged democracy, 
Regional Dummies, War Dummy, 
Socialist Dummy, Year Dummies, 
Country Dummies, Lagged Income 
According to the study 
democracy promotes 
economic development in a 
subtle way depending on the 
details of democratic 
reforms. Presidential 
democracies seem to 
promote growth faster than 
parliamentary democracies. 
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10. D. Acemoglu 
S. Naidu 
P. Restrepo 
J. A. Robinson 
(2015) 
175 countries 
(annual data) 
1960-2010 Use of a dynamic (linear) panel 
model for GDP-FE OLS 
regression Estimation methods: 
within estimator, Arellano and 
Bond’s GMM estimator and 
HHK29 estimator Semi-
parametric estimates of the effect 
of democratizations on log GDP 
p.c. IV estimates of the effect of 
democracy on log GDP p.c. 
Effects of democracy on 
potential mechanisms of 
economic growth Heterogeneous 
effects of democracy on log 
GDP p.c. 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), 
Ln(GDP p.c.) initial level, Investment 
Share of GDP, TFP30, 
Trade Share of GDP, Primary 
Enrollment Rate, Secondary 
Enrollment Rate, Tax Revenue Share 
of GDP, Child Mortality Per 1000 
births, Unrest Dummy, Market 
Reforms Index (0-100) 
There is ample evidence that 
democracy has a significant and robust 
positive effect on GDP per capita. The 
results suggest that democracy 
increases future GDP (by about 20-25% 
in the 25 years following 
democratization) by encouraging 
investment, increasing schooling, 
inducing economic reforms, improving 
public goods provision, and reducing 
social unrest. There is little support for 
the view that democracy is a constraint 
on economic growth for less developed 
economies. 
11. M.N. Aziz 
& 
S.D.D. 
Sundarasen 
(2015) 
7  
countries 
(ASEAN31) 
(annual data) 
2000-2009 Modified Solow type growth 
model is estimated by 
POLS,FE,RE,2SLS, 
SGMM32 used for both 
static(long -run) and 
dynamic(short-run) models 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%) 
PPP adjusted (WDI), RGDP p.c. PPP 
adjusted (2005)(WDI),Log labor 
force, Log gross fixed capital 
formation as % GDP, Log human 
capital, Log NCI33, Log Polity2, Log 
Conflict, Log GFC34 
 
The study finds that both intrinsic and 
extrinsic determinants of economic 
growth are significant. However, 
countervailing effects of extrinsic 
variables are documented for growth in 
ASEAN countries. Political regime 
type, so democracy also, is found to be 
statistically insignificant. 
12. H. 
Doucouliagos 
& 
 M.A. 
Ulubasoglu 
(2008) 
84 published 
papers on 
democracy  
& 
 growth 
483 estimates 
1985-2005 Meta-regression analysis(MRA) 
OLS, FE & RE meta-regression 
models, the bootstrap 
 
Partial correlation between 
democracy and economic growth, a 
set of Binary Variables taking the 
value of 1 if included in the studies in 
question and 0 otherwise including: 
Region, Inequality, Eco-freedom, 
Instability, Inflation, Population, 
Convergence, Human Capital, 
Physical Capital, etc. 
The results of the meta-analysis showed 
that democracy does not have a direct 
impact on economic growth. However, 
it has robust, significant and positive 
indirect effects through higher human 
capital, lower inflation, lower political 
instability and higher economic 
freedom. 
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13. J. F. Helliwell 
(1994) 
125 countries 
(annual data) 
1960-1985 Pooled cross-sectional 
and panel data analysis. 
Use of a comparative 
growth framework in 
which growth of GDP per 
adult depends negatively 
on initial income levels, 
as implied by the 
convergence hypothesis, 
and positively on rates of 
investment in physical and 
human capital. 
Method of estimation: 
OLS stacked-Iterative 
Zellner, IV 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.a. Growth (%), 
Ln(GDP p.a.) initial level, Ln(GDP 
p.a.) (85),Democracy Index-Bollen60, 
Democracy Index-Gastill76, 
Investment rate, Primary Schooling, 
Secondary Schooling, n+g+δ, Scale 
The general result of the growth analysis is that 
it is still not possible to identify any systematic 
net effects of democracy on subsequent 
economic growth. However, there is a robust 
positive relation between the level of per capita 
income and the adoption of democracy. 
14. J.M. Mbaku 
& 
M.S. Kimenyi 
(1997) 
46 countries 
 (annual data) 
 
 
1950-1985 WLS35 Regression 
Analysis of the effects of 
political freedom on 
macroeconomic growth 
with the use of the 
Kormendi-Meguire 
Growth Model 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), 
Ln(GDP p.c.) initial level, Mean 
Annual Rate of Population Growth, 
S.D.36 of Real Output Growth, S.D. of 
Money Supply Shocks, Mean of Money 
Supply Growth, Mean Growth Rate of 
Ratio Government Spending to Output, 
Mean Growth of Exports as a 
Proportion of Output, Mean Growth 
Rate of Inflation, Mean Investment to 
Income Ratio, Political Democracy 
Index 
The results confirm the positive relationship 
between political freedom and economic growth. 
15. C. Kurzman, 
R. Werum, and  
R.E. Burkhart 
(2002) 
106 countries 
(annual data) 
1951-1980 Pooled Time Series 
Analysis 
OLS on 30 years means 
MLE37 AR(1) correction 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth 
(%)(PWT), Investmentt, Literacyt=0, 
Literacyt, Life Expectancyt=0, Life 
Expectancyt, Initial Wealtht=0, Initial 
Wealtht, Population Growtht, 
Democracyt, Government Spendingt, 
Riotst, World System Position 
Little or no direct effect emerges between 
democracy and economic growth, but positive 
indirect effects appear via two mechanisms: a 
marginally significant effect via investment and 
a robust effect via government expenditure. 
Democracy also has a robust non-linear effect on 
economic growth via social unrest, inhibiting 
growth under non-democratic regimes and 
furthering it in highly democratic ones. 
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16. T. Plümper  
&  
C. W. Martin 
(2003) 
83 countries 
(annual data) 
1975-1997 OLS Regression Analysis 
of a political economic 
model that predicts a 
systematic non-linear 
relationship between 
democracy and government 
spending as well as 
between democracy and 
economic growth 
 
 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), 
Government Consumption/GDP, 
Initial (1975) Log GDP p.c., 
Investment share of GDP, 
Population Growth, 
Human Capital (lagged), 
Institutional Openness (Sachs-Warner 
dummy), Democracy (polity), 
Democracy squared, Regional 
Dummies, Bicameralism, 
Durability of Political System, 
Number of Veto Players 
 
 
The results show that an increase in 
democracy tends to raise growth rates 
of per capita income. However, the 
beneficial impact of democracy on 
growth holds true only for moderate 
degrees of political participation. It is 
also empirically shown that there is a 
non-linear, inverse U-shaped relation 
between the level of democracy and 
growth of per capita income and that 
the impact of government spending on 
economic growth is higher in more 
democratic countries. Finally, it is 
demonstrated that the level of 
democracy and government share of 
GDP are correlated in a U-shaped 
manner. 
17. L. Arfaoui,  
A. Ziadi,  
S. Manai 
(2016) 
1 country 
(Tunisia) 
(annual data) 
1980-2014 Time Series Data Analysis 
Unit Root Tests ADF38 
Co-integration 
Autoregressive Distributed 
Lag Model 
(ARDL39) 
Granger Causality Test 
ECM40 
Diagnostic tests 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), 
Political Rights (PR), 
Civil Liberties (CL), 
Democracy=(PR+CL)/2 
 
The empirical results of this analysis 
have shown that in a nascent democracy 
such as the case of Tunisia democracy 
has no effect on economic growth in the 
short term. The addition of an 
observation rate of GDP during the 
period of post –revolution Tunisia 
generates a saw-tooth trend which 
demonstrates the unstable economic 
situation in the country. 
18. W. B. Djezou 
(2014) 
1 country 
(Côte d’Ivoire) 
(annual data) 
1960-2012  Time Series Data Analysis 
Unit Root Tests ADF 
Co-integration 
Autoregressive Distributed 
Lag Model 
(ARDL) 
Granger Causality Test 
VECM41 
OLS, FM-OLS42, D-OLS43 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), 
Democracy (Polity IV), 
Regime Durability (Polity IV) 
The results show co-integration of 
economic growth and democracy in the 
long run when regime durability is 
taken into account. The tests for 
causality show long run causality 
running from GDP per capita and 
regime durability to democracy. 
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19. A. Assiotis 
 &  
K. Sylwester 
(2010) 
119 countries 
(annual data) 
1984-2007 Panel data regressions FE, 
Dynamic GMM regressions 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth 
(%) PPP adjusted (PWT), 
Population Growth rate, 
Democracy Index(FH44), 
Control of Corruption Index, 
DE*CO(interaction between 
democracy and control of 
corruption), Annual Government 
Share of RGDP p.c., Annual 
Investment Share 
of RGDP p.c., Reform Dummy, 
 
There is a positive relationship 
between economic growth and the 
degree of democracy that a 
country has as well as between 
economic growth and the control 
of corruption. 
 
However, the coefficient on the 
interactive term, combining 
democracy with control of 
corruption, is negative, suggesting 
that the benefits upon growth of 
controlling corruption are actually 
greater in authoritarian regimes. 
20. M.Vega-Gordillo,  
& 
J. L. Alvarez-Arce 
(2003) 
45 countries 
(annual data),  
(5-year 
averages 
used) 
1975-1995 Use of a dynamic model defining 
causality along the lines 
established by Granger, 6 
equations as parts of the model are 
tested for causality; equation of 
interest for us is the one connecting 
political freedom with economic 
growth. Estimation methods used 
are GMM1,GMM2 and AH45 
instrumental variable estimator 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth 
(%), Index of Economic 
Freedom, Index of Political 
Freedom 
 
 
The dynamic relationships 
estimated strongly suggest that 
economic freedom fosters 
economic growth. 
 
The impact of political freedom 
on economic growth is much less 
clear but at least it is certain that it 
does not impede economic 
growth. 
21. J.C. Heckelman 
(2010) 
25 countries 
(transition 
nations) 
(annual data) 
2000-2004 Several OLS Regressions with 
different democracy indicators. 
 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth 
(%), Log RGDP p.c. initial level, 
Gross capital formation to GDP 
ratio averaged over the 2000 – 
2004 period, A dummy variable 
for the nations which comprise 
the CIS46, Democracy indicators 
While the Freedom House 
democracy index is found to be 
statistically significant, the civil 
liberties component of this index 
is more robustly related to growth 
than is the political rights 
component. 
 
It is also found that among six 
different areas of democratic 
freedoms only freedoms in civil 
society and electoral process are 
robustly correlated with growth. 
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22. V.C. Jaunky 
(2013) 
28 countries 
(SSA) 
(annual data) 
1980-2005 Various panel unit root and 
cointegration tests, Panel 
VECM-based causality test, 
Blundell-Bond GMM2, 
Panel FM-OLS,D-OLS 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. 
Growth (%), Log DEM47 
Economic growth is found to cause 
democracy in the short-run, while 
bidirectionality is uncovered in the 
long-run. 
 
Democracy has a positive impact on 
GDP and vice versa. These results 
lend support to the virtuous cycle 
hypothesis. 
23. K. Grundler  
&  
T. Krieger 
(2016) 
185 countries 
(annual data), 
(5-year period 
averages used) 
1981-2011 Arellano-Bond dynamic panel 
data estimation technique 
GMM & WG(Within-Group) 
controlled for other democracy 
indicators such as POLITY, 
VANHAVEN, ACEMOGLU, 
FREEDOM HOUSE, BOIX, 
UDS 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. 
Growth (%)lagged t-1,Log 
RGDP p.c. initial level, 
SVMDI48, Log RGDP p.c., 
Investment Share, Government 
Consumption, Inflation Rate, 
Degree of Openness, Log 
Fertility Rate, Average Years 
of Schooling, Log Life 
Expectancy 
Evidence from a novel measure of 
democracy (SVMDI) based on 
Support Vector Machines highlights 
a robust positive relationship 
between democracy and economic 
growth. 
The transmission channels through 
which democracy exerts its 
influence on growth are that 
democratic countries have better 
educated populations, higher 
investment shares, lower fertility 
rates, but not necessarily higher 
levels of redistribution. 
24. J.A.Minier 
(1998) 
35 countries 
(annual data), 
(5-year and 20-
year period 
averages used) 
96 countries 
(annual data) 
(Used only in 
R.T.A.) 
1965-1987 Standard Growth Regression 
OLS-Growth Regression OLS 
with Control Groups per 
country of interest-Use of 
Predicted vs Actual Growth 
Rates-Indirect Effects of 
changes in democracy on 
education and investment are 
measured-Regression Tree 
Analysis (R.T.A.) 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. 
Growth (%),Log RGDP p.c. 
initial level, Investment, 
Education, Log Fertility, 
Log Life Expectancy, 
Educational Spending, 
Government Consumption, 
Democracy,  Democracy 
Squared, Civil Rights, Terms of 
Trade, Black Market Premium, 
Democracy Increase, 
Democracy Decrease 
 
Countries that democratize are 
found to grow faster than a priori 
similar countries, while countries 
that become less democratic grow 
more slowly than comparable 
countries. Regression tree analysis 
indicates that democracy, along with 
initial income and literacy, is a 
significant variable in determining 
multiple-growth regimes. Human 
capital is more important for growth 
in more democratic countries while 
physical capital in less democratic 
ones. 
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25. L.J. Comeau 
(2003) 
82 countries 
(annual data) 
1972-1989 Basic Multivariate 
Regression Analysis, 
Panel OLS of an equation 
depicting the empirical 
counterpart of the 
extended neoclassical 
model 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%) PPP 
adjusted, Ln GDP initial level, Avg. growth 
rate of population, Avg. level of physical 
capital investment as % of GDP, Regime Type 
(avg. level of political rights, Gastil), 
Quadratic specification of Regime Type, 
Sociopolitical Instability (s.d. of Gastil series), 
Initial level of Gastil political rights per 
country, Initial Democratic Capital, Avg. level 
of Economic Freedom, Quadratic specification 
of Economic Freedom, Low-level human 
capital (% of population achieving basic 
schooling), High-level human capital (% of 
population achieving higher schooling), 5 
regional dummies 
Initial democratic capital, that is 
the political legacy of a country, 
is important to its future economic 
growth. Democratic types of 
political regime are more 
favorable for economic 
prosperity. A nonlinear 
relationship exists between 
growth and regime type. 
Sociopolitical stability is a 
necessary complementary 
condition for economic growth. 
26. Y. Feng 
(1996) 
40 countries 
(SSA) 
(annual data) 
1960-1992 Basic Regression 
Analysis, Panel OLS & 
2SLS, of a basic 
multivariate statistical 
model depicting the 
impact on economic 
growth of a democracy 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), 
Democracy index, Ln GDP initial level, 
Primary School Enrollment Rate 1960, 
Infant Mortality Rate 1960, Avg. ratio of Real 
Domestic Investment to RGDP, 
Inflation, Exports % GDP 
The conclusion from this study is 
that the economy grows faster 
under a regime that enjoys a high 
level of institutionalized 
democracy and that there exists a 
positive feedback relationship 
between democracy and growth. 
27. J.C.Bluedorn 
(2001) 
31-88 
countries 
(annual data), 
(10-year 
period 
averages used) 
 
1960-1990 SUR system estimating 3 
equations where each 
equation is fitted for a 
particular decade 1960’s, 
1970’s, and 1980’s. 
The system is estimated 
four times, each using a 
larger set of independent 
variables. 
Avg. Annual Decadal RGDP p.c. Growth (%), 
ELF, Democracy measure, Decadal intercepts, 
Regional dummies, Log decadal initial 
income, Log schooling, Assassinations, Log 
telephones/worker, Fiscal surplus/GDP, 
Financial depth-Black market-Exchange rate 
premium 
 
 
This paper presents further 
empirical evidence supportive of 
democracy’s positive role in 
ameliorating ethnic diversity. 
However, it also shows that 
endogeneity problems and some 
negative direct effects of 
democracy weaken the case for 
establishing democratic 
institutions as a policy solution 
for poor economic performance 
due to ethnic diversity. 
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28. A. Pourgerami 
(1988) 
92 countries 
(annual data) 
1965-1984 Regression (OLS) and Causality 
Analysis of several development-
democracy-growth causality 
models constructed for this study 
as well as hypothesis testing with 
the use of contingency tables 
Avg. Annual GNP49 p.c. Growth (%), 
Market, Development, Culture, 
Investment, Education, Democracy, 
Labor, Welfare 
Development affects democracy 
directly and indirectly via education 
and investment. 
 
There is a positive causal association 
between democracy and growth 
which is transmitted both directly and 
indirectly via labor and welfare. 
29. R. Salahodjaev 
(2015) 
93 countries 
 (annual data) 
1970-2013 Basic Regression Analysis and 
OLS-IV-RREG50 estimation of a 
model used to empirically 
investigate the interactive effect of 
democracy and intelligence on 
economic growth with several 
robustness regressions run in 
order to validate the results 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), 
Democracy index, National IQ51, Ln 
RGDP p.c. initial level,  Gross fixed 
capital formation (% of GDP), 
Average years of schooling at all 
levels, Population growth (annual 
%), Trade (% of GDP), General 
government final consumption 
expenditure (% of GDP) 
The results show that the relationship 
link between democracy and the real 
GDP growth varies with a nation's 
level of cognitive abilities. The 
results remain robust to various 
estimation techniques, control 
variables and time periods. 
30. C.H.Knutsen 
(2013) 
45 countries 
(SSA) 
(annual data) 
1972-2004 The baseline Model I is an 
ordinary least squares regression 
with panel corrected standard 
errors (OLS PCSE), which utilizes 
both cross-national and inter-
temporal variation for inference. 
Model II is a F.E. model to 
control for country-specific 
effects. Models III, IV & V are 
Arellano Bond Dynamic Panel 
Data Models which incorporate 
lagged growth as a regressor in 
order to simultaneously mitigate 
endogeneity and omitted variable 
bias 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), 
Democracy Index, Bureaucratic 
Quality Index, Statehist5, Ln RGDP 
p.c. initial level, Ln regime duration, 
Ln population, ELF, Catholic 
(dummy), Protestant (dummy),Sunni 
(dummy), Indigenous religion 
(dummy), British colony (dummy), 
French colony (dummy), Portuguese 
colony (dummy), Belgian colony 
(dummy), 1970s (dummy), 1980s 
(dummy), 1990s (dummy) 
 
 
The empirical analysis finds a 
positive and robust effect of 
democracy on growth in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, a continent historically 
characterized by weak-capacity 
states. Furthermore, the paper 
identifies a robust interaction effect 
between democracy and state 
capacity on growth, both in Africa 
and globally; the effect of democracy 
on growth increases when state 
capacity is reduced. Democracy is 
estimated to have a positive effect on 
growth in weak-capacity states, but 
not in high-capacity states. 
Additionally, the results indicate that 
state capacity enhances growth only 
in dictatorships. 
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31. J.B. Madsen, 
P.A. Raschky, 
A. Skali 
(2015) 
141 countries 
(annual data) 
1820-2000 
1500-2000 
A baseline model is estimated using 
pooled cross-section and time-series 
data where the dependent variable is 
per capita real GDP in purchasing 
power parity. Instruments are used 
for democracy and literacy because 
of likely feedback effects from 
income. The model is estimated using 
an unbalanced panel as far back for 
each country as the data are 
available. OLS Regressions are run 
for several models and the methods 
of estimation used are FE, 2SLS-FE, 
and the Arellano-Bond System GMM 
estimator. A second baseline growth 
model is estimated which allows for 
the influence of critical junctures 
using cross-section OLS regressions. 
Ln RGDP p.c., Ln RGDP p.c. lagged 
Secondary Educational Attainment, 
Literacy Rate (%), Leader’s Natural 
Death, Resource Dispersion, 
Democracy Index(Polity2), 
Linguistic Distance-Weighted 
Strength of Democracy, Vector of 
country dummies, Vector of Time 
dummies, Number of years in 1900 
since the establishment of the first 
university divided by 100, Literacy 
(%), A measure of the constraints on 
the executive during the first ten 
years of independence, Year of 
Independence, Catholic measure 
(fraction), Protestant measure 
(fraction), Muslim measure (fraction) 
Democracy is found to be a 
significant determinant of 
income and growth and the 
result is robust to various 
estimation methods and 
covariates. It is found that a 
one-standard deviation 
increase in democracy is 
associated with a 44–98% 
increase in per capita income. 
32. J. Fidrmuc 
(2003) 
25 countries 
(CEE52 & 
FSU53) 
 (annual data) 
(5-year avg.) 
 
1990-2000 A baseline growth model is estimated 
using cross-section OLS regressions 
with the GDP growth rate as the 
dependent variable. To capture the 
changes in the course of transition of 
the underlying model of growth, 
identical regressions have been 
estimated for a sequence of 5-year 
moving-window periods between 
1990 and 2000. 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), 
Democracy Index, Liberalization 
Index, Investment Ratio (%), 
Government Expenditure (%), 
Brussels (ths.54 km), Secondary 
School Enrollment, War Dummy, 
War Dummy Lagged, 1989 GNP p.c. 
(log ths. $), 
The results suggest that 
democracy reinforces progress 
in economic liberalization, 
which, in turn, improves 
growth. Hence, 
democratization had a positive 
effect on growth during 
transition, albeit indirectly, 
through facilitating economic 
liberalization. 
33. M.T. Rock 
(2009) 
12 countries 
(East Asia)  
(annual data) 
 
 
1960-2004 OLS-2 SLS fixed country and time 
effects panel regressions of 
democracy and autocracy on growth 
and investment. 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), 
Regime dummies, Regime transition 
dummies, State Capacity Variables, 
Number of Veto Players, Gross 
Capital Formation (% GDP), 
Population growth rate, Government 
Consumption (% GDP), FDI (% 
GDP), Trade, Inflation, Control of 
Corruption, Regime Durability 
Findings reject the democracy 
slows growth hypothesis and 
show that democracy causes 
growth and investment to rise. 
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34. E. Flachaire, 
C.G. Peñalosa, 
M. Konte 
(2014) 
79 countries 
(annual data) 
1975-2005 
 
Standard Regression 
Models, Pooled OLS, 
FE & RE, 
Finite Mixture 
Regression Models 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth 
(%)-5yr.55 periods, Ln RGDP 
p.c. initial level, Ln of 
population growth, Ln of 
investment rate, Ln of initial 
average years of education of the 
total population aged over 25, 
Initial index of political 
institutions, Initial index of 
economic institutions, Index of 
political institutions in 1975, 
Index of economic institutions in 
1975 
Our results indicate that the data is best 
described by an econometric model with 
two growth regimes. Political institutions 
are the key determinant of which regime an 
economy belongs to, while economic 
institutions have a direct impact on growth 
rates within each regime. These findings 
support the hypothesis that political 
institutions are one of the deep causes of 
growth, setting the stage in which 
economic institutions and standard 
covariates operate. 
35. T. Persson 
& 
G. Tabellini 
(1992) 
50 countries 
 (annual data) 
 
 
1960-1985 Standard Growth 
Regressions estimated 
with OLS on income 
distribution and on 
other explanatory 
variables 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth 
(%), Ln RGDP p.c. initial level, 
Primary School Enrollment (% 
pop.), Agricultural Sector Labor 
Force (% total labor force), Gini 
coefficient for the distribution of 
land ownership, Democracy 
Index, Income Equality Measure 
Income inequality is bad for growth in 
democracies, while land concentration is 
bad for growth everywhere. 
36. C. Wu 
(2012) 
3167 country-
years for 
autocracies and 
1942 country-
years for 
democracies 
(annual data) 
1960-2001 Panel Data Models RE 
& FE and OLS PCSE 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth 
(%), Ln RGDP p.c. initial level, 
Democratic Levels, Summed 
Hostility, War, Fuel and Ore 
p.c., ELF, Government, 
Investment, Saving, Coast, 
Tropical, Trade/GDP, Regional 
Dummies 
The effects of democracy on economic 
growth, among other things, depend on the 
level of external threat as well as on the 
level of natural resource intensity. 
37. H. Zouhaier 
& 
K.M. Karim 
(2012) 
11  
countries 
(MENA) 
(annual data) 
2000-2009 Dynamic Panel Data 
Model, GMM Arellano-
Bond estimation 
method 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth 
(%), Growth Rate Lagged, 
Investment, Openness in Trade, 
Government Expenditures, 
Financial Development, Political 
Rights, Civil Liberties 
The main findings derived from this 
empirical analysis reveal a positive impact 
of democracy on investment, a positive 
effect of civil liberties on economic 
growth, and a positive interaction between 
political rights and investment. 
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38. A. Alesina 
& 
D. Rodrik 
(1994) 
70 countries 
(annual data) 
1960-1985 
 
Model of endogenous growth 
with distributive conflict among 
agents endowed with varying 
capital/labor shares. 
 
OLS and TSLS56 growth 
regressions. 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln 
RGDP p.c. initial level, Primary school 
enrollment ratio 1960, Gini coefficient 
of income inequality 1960, Gini 
coefficient of land distribution inequality 
1960, Democracy dummy, Literacy rate 
1960, Infant mortality rate 1965, 
Secondary enrollment rate 1960, Fertility 
rate 1965, Africa dummy 
The results indicate that 
inequality in income and land 
distribution is negatively 
associated with subsequent 
growth. 
 
Also, they show that 
democracies do not grow 
faster than or more slowly than 
dictatorships. 
39. A.M. Ali 
(2003) 
112 countries 
 (annual data) 
 
 
1975-1994 Standard Growth Regressions 
based on the Solow neoclassical 
growth model as modified by 
Mankiw with the addition of 
human capital estimated with 
OLS on ICRG57-BERI58 
institutional variables and on 
other explanatory variables 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln 
RGDP p.c. initial level, Avg. annual 
population growth rate, Avg. investment-
GDP ratio, Initial school enrollment rate 
1975, Economic freedom index, Avg. 
rate of government expenditure on GDP, 
Avg. inflation rate, Political Rights, Civil 
Liberties, S.D. of growth of domestic 
credit, Trade, Law, Repudiation of 
contracts risk, Expropriation of property 
risk, Quality of Bureaucracy index, 
Corruption index, Efficiency of 
Bureaucracy index, Enforcement of 
contracts index, Infrastructure quality 
index, Nationalization of private 
property risk 
The empirical results reveal 
that countries with high levels 
of economic growth are 
characterized by high levels of 
economic freedom and judicial 
efficiency, low levels of 
corruption, effective 
bureaucracy, and protected 
private property. The results 
also indicate that economic 
freedom is an important 
determinant of growth and 
investment. 
40. A.M. Ali 
& 
W. M. Crain 
(2002) 
119 countries 
 (annual data) 
 
 
1975-1989 EBA (Extreme Bound Analysis) 
on the coefficient of a set of core 
regression variables derived 
from a set of Standard Growth 
Regressions 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln 
RGDP p.c. initial level, Share of 
investment in RGDP p.c., Avg. annual 
population growth rate, Avg. investment-
GDP ratio, Initial secondary enrollment 
rate 1975, Economic freedom index, 
Avg. rate of government expenditure on 
GDP, Avg. inflation rate, Political 
Rights, Civil Liberties, S.D. of growth of 
domestic credit, Trade 
Political regimes and civil 
liberties, as distinct from 
economic freedom, do not 
appear to matter systematically 
for growth. The quality of a 
country’s economic 
infrastructure is not 
necessarily connected to its 
political regime or levels of 
civil liberties. 
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41. H. Almeida 
& 
D. Ferreira 
(2002) 
138 countries 
(annual data) 
1960-1990 
 
Standard cross-country 
Growth Regressions 
estimated by OLS. IV 
Regressions. Country FE 
Growth Regressions. 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln 
RGDP p.c. initial level, Investment rate, 
Government consumption, Government 
investment in education, Avg. number of 
years of enrollment in primary education, 
Avg. number of years of enrollment in 
secondary and higher education, Log of 
total population, Democracy index, Log 
of  fertility, Log of life expectancy at 
birth, Terms of trade shock, Black market 
premium, OECD dummy, Urbanization 
rate, Resource dependence, Property 
rights index, Business regulation index, 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization, Legal 
origin, Religion, Latitude, 6 Time 
dummies, 138 country dummies 
Less democratic countries seem to 
have more variable growth rates and 
policies than more democratic ones. 
42. R.J. Barro 
(2000) 
87 countries 
 (annual data) 
 
 
1965-1995 Standard Panel Growth 
Regressions based on the 
Solow neoclassical growth 
model as modified by 
Barro estimated with 
3SLS on several 
instrumental variables 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln 
RGDP p.c. initial level, Years of 
Schooling, Inflation rate, Democracy 
index, Rule of Law index, Government 
Consumption/GDP, Investment/GDP, 
Log Total fertility rate, Growth rate of 
terms of trade 
Evidence from a broad panel of 
countries shows little overall 
relation between income inequality 
and rates of growth and investment. 
For growth, there is an indication 
that inequality retards growth in 
poor countries but encourages 
growth in richer places. 
43. D. Assane 
& 
A. Pourgerami 
(1994) 
33 countries 
(10 CFA59-23 
SSA) 
 (annual data) 
 
 
1970-1989 Estimation of a cross-
section and time-series 
empirical growth model 
with OLS regressions and 
SUR 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), 
Population Growth, S.D. of Output 
Growth, Money Supply Growth, S.D of 
Money Supply Growth, Inflation rate, 
S.D. of Inflation, Growth of Government 
Spending Share, Growth of Export 
Earnings Share, Growth of Investment 
Share, Lack of Civil Liberties, Oil 
Dummy, Calamity Dummy, CFA 
Dummy, Time Period Dummy 
The results suggest that African 
economies have experienced similar 
growth trends, which were higher in 
the 1970s than in the 1980s. No 
significant differences exist between 
CFA and SSA economies. The 
results also suggest a positive 
impact on output growth by 
monetary expansion and capital 
formation and a negative one by 
inflation and government spending. 
A monetary union does not 
necessarily lead to faster growth. 
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44. M. Bleaney 
& 
A. Nishiyama 
(2002) 
138 countries 
(annual data) 
1965-1990 
 
Comparisons between 
alternative models by testing 
model adequacy and 
performing non-nested tests 
against an encompassing model 
derived from a pair of the 
following models under 
consideration: Barro, Easterly 
& Levine, and Sachs & Warner. 
 
Standard Growth Regression of 
the encompassing model by 
using a general-to-specific 
modeling procedure, 
successively eliminating the 
independent variable with the 
smallest t-statistic and re-
estimating until each variable is 
significant at the 0.05 
significance level. 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%) PPP 
adjusted, Log of Income per economically 
active person 1965, Openness dummy, 
Black Market Premium avg. 1970-1990, 
Male secondary-higher schooling 1965, 
Female secondary-higher schooling 1965, 
Financial depth avg. 1965-1990, Inflation 
rate avg. 1965-1990, Log Fertility rate 
1965, Central government savings/GDP, 
Government consumption/GDP, Log Life 
expectancy 1965, Institutional quality, 
Assassinations per 1m persons, Democracy 
index, Terms of trade growth 1965-1990, 
Primary product exports/GDP, Tropical 
climate, Landlockedness, Economically 
active minus total population growth, Ethnic 
diversity, Fraction of GDP in mining, Rule 
of Law index, Saving ratio, Neighbor 
countries’ growth 
The results suggest that many of 
the new variables that have 
been introduced into growth 
regressions in the 1990’s such 
as human capital, institutions 
(democracy), specialization in 
primary products, and terms of 
trade changes all seem to be 
important determinants of 
growth. 
There is also evidence of 
significant non-linearity in the 
relationship between income 
levels and finally, the data 
strongly prefer an 
encompassing model, but fail to 
reject any of the candidate 
models, implying that each 
model represents a partial truth. 
45. M. Chatterji 
(1998) 
81 countries 
 (annual data) 
 
 
1960-1985 Standard Panel Growth 
Regressions based on the Solow 
neoclassical growth model 
estimated with OLS on several 
explanatory variables 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln 
RGDP p.c. initial level, Log secondary ed. 
enrollment rate 1960, Percent change of 
secondary enrollment rate 1960-1985, Log 
tertiary ed. enrollment rate 1960, Log Real 
Domestic Investment/RGDP, Percent 
change of tertiary enrollment rate 1960-
1985, Political rights index, OECD dummy 
The results suggest that tertiary 
education may well have an 
important role to play in the 
growth process. Tertiary 
education did displace 
secondary education as the 
major driver of growth. 
46. P. Collier 
(2000) 
94 countries 
 (annual data) 
 
 
1960-1990 Simple model of government 
choice between growth and 
redistribution empirically tested 
with standard growth 
regressions regressing growth 
on ethnic fractionalization and 
political rights estimated with 
OLS 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln 
RGDP p.c. initial level, Log Population, 
Landlocked dummy, Political rights index, 
ELF index, Education, Corruption, Risk 
rating, Openness 
The results show that ethnic 
diversity is only detrimental in 
the context of limited political 
rights. In dictatorships it is 
highly detrimental since a 
highly diverse society loses up 
to 3% of annual GDP growth. 
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47. J.W. Dawson 
(1998) 
85 countries 
(annual data) 
1975-1990 
 
Standard Panel cross-country 
Growth Regressions based on 
an extension of the human 
capital augmented version of 
the Solow neoclassical growth 
model estimated with OLS and 
3SLS on several explanatory 
variables 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.w. Growth (%), 
Ln RGDP p.w. initial level, Initial 
income, Investment share, Labor force 
growth, Human capital, Initial freedom, 
Change in freedom, Political Rights 
index, Civil liberties index, Economic 
freedom index, Initial political freedom, 
Change in political freedom, Initial 
economic freedom, Change in 
economic freedom, Initial civil 
freedom, Change in civil freedom 
The empirical results indicate that 
free-market institutions have a 
positive effect on growth; 
economic freedom affects growth 
through both a direct effect on total 
factor productivity and an indirect 
effect on investment; political and 
civil liberties may stimulate 
investment; an important 
interaction exists between freedom 
and human capital investment; 
Milton Friedman’s 5 conjectures 
on the relation between political 
and economic freedom are correct; 
promoting economic freedom is an 
effective policy toward facilitating 
growth and other types of freedom. 
48. D. Rodrik 
(1999) 
104 countries 
 (annual data) 
 
 
1960-1989 OLS Regression Analysis 
including variables measuring 
latent social conflicts and 
external shocks 
Growth differential between two sub-
periods (1975-89,1960-75), Regional 
Dummies, Lagged Growth 1960-75, 
Log GDP p.c. 1975, External Shocks 
measure, Income Inequality measure, 
Institutions (ICRG), ELF60, 
Democracy Index, Rule of Law, 
Participation, Bureaucratic Efficiency, 
No corruption, Log social spending 
The study concludes that latent 
social conflicts and the institutions 
of conflict management matter to 
the persistence of economic growth 
and that their effects are 
measurable. Participatory and 
democratic institutions, the rule of 
law, and social insurance are all 
components of a strategy to 
enhance resilience to volatility in 
the external environment. 
49. A.A. 
Goldsmith 
(1995) 
59 countries 
 (annual data) 
 
 
1988-1993 Standard Panel Growth 
Regressions based on the Solow 
neoclassical growth model 
estimated with OLS on several 
explanatory variables 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), 
Gross Domestic Investment (% 
GDP1990), Exports (% GDP1990), Ex-
socialist countries dummy, Political 
Rights Index (1992-93), Property 
Rights Index, Human Rights, Credit, 
Risk 
The results show that political and 
property rights enhance economic 
growth. Democratic and free 
market rules are associated with 
faster growth in transitional 
countries. 
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50. J.B. Durham 
(1999) 
105 countries 
 (annual data) 
 
 
1960-1989 Standard Growth 
Regressions GLS RE 
models 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth 
(%), Effective Party/Constitutional 
Framework (EP/CF), Log EP/CF, 
Square EP/CF, Log Initial GDP, 
Investment Ratio, Male Education 
Rate, Female Education Rate, 
Population Growth, Openness to 
Trade, Government Ratio, Regional 
Dummies 
The results show that the effective 
party/constitutional framework 
measure does not correlate with 
growth or investment in the total 
sample. But considering development 
levels, some evidence indicates that 
discretion decreases growth in 
advanced areas, and, contrary to 
theory, inhibits investment in poorer 
countries. Also, single-party 
dictatorships have higher investment 
ratios but do not grow faster than 
party-less regimes. 
51. J.A. Minier 
(2003) 
27 countries 
 (annual data) 
 
 
1960-1990 5-year panel growth 
regressions and 20-year 
cross-sectional 
regressions estimated 
with time and country 
fixed effects 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth 
(%), Ln RGDP p.c. initial level, 
Investment, Education, Democracy 
Index, Fertility, Life Expectancy, 
Ed. Spending, Govt. Consumption, 
Black Market Premium, Terms of 
Trade, Civil Liberties Index, 
Democratic Movement Dummy, 
Repressed Dummy, Reluctant 
Conciliatory Dummy, Democratic 
Transition Dummy, Duration of 
democratic movement 
The results show that democratic 
movements are negatively correlated 
with economic growth and 
government repression of those 
movements appears to some extent to 
cancel out these effects on growth. 
52. B. Fayissa 
& 
M. I. El-Kaissy 
(1999) 
80 countries 
 (annual data) 
 
 
1971-1990 Use of an extended 
production function 
arising from the Lucas 
and Romer endogenous 
growth model. 
 
Cross-sectional 
Regressions-OLS 
estimates of the effects 
of foreign aid and human 
capital on economic 
growth. 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth 
(%), Avg. foreign aid (% GDP), 
Avg. gross domestic savings (% 
GDP), Avg. annual growth rate of 
labor, Avg. annual growth rate of 
real export values, Percent of pupils 
enrolled in vocational or teacher-
training secondary school, Political 
and Civil stability index 
The study shows that foreign aid has 
a statistically positive effect on 
economic growth in developing 
countries. 
 
Lack of political and civil liberties is 
found to have a negative, but 
statistically marginal impact on 
economic growth. 
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53. Y. Feng 
(1995) 
19 countries 
(Latin America) 
 (annual data) 
 
 
1982-1988 Pooled Time Series 
Cross-section analysis-
Standard Growth 
Regressions estimated 
with OLS and EGLS60 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), 
Civil government dummy, Democracy 
dummy, Political Rights and Civil 
Liberties index, Institutionalized 
Democracy indicator, Political Rights 
Index, Civil Liberties Index, Annual 
Inflation Rate, Investment share of 
growth of GDP, Long-term gov. debt in 
real $,  Long-term priv. debt in real $, 
Exports of goods and services in real $, 
Real national income lagged, Percent of 
GDP Investment 
The conclusion from this study 
is that the economy grows 
faster under a civilian rather 
than a military government 
and both political rights and 
civil liberties contribute to 
growth. 
54. R. Gounder 
(2002) 
1 country 
(Fiji) 
(annual  data) 
1968-1996 Time series co-
integration analysis 
(ARDL) based on a 
neoclassical Solow-type 
growth model. 
 
Statistical tests run: F-
test, LM, RESET, JBN, 
ARCH 
Annual growth rate of national income, 
Annual growth rate of effective labor 
force, Total investment to output ratio, 
Civil liberties and political rights index, 
Economic freedom index, Post-military 
coup dummy, Government revenue (% 
GDP), Defense expenditure to GDP 
share, Government consumptions as a 
ratio of GDP, Fiscal balance, Openness 
of trade 
Empirical results support the 
view that democratic values 
and economic freedom are 
significant for growth. A 
statistical test for the 
endogeneity of democracy 
rejects reverse causality, and 
so democratic environment 
and economic freedom lead to 
higher economic growth. The 
results also indicate that 
military coups are detrimental 
to growth. 
55. E.L. Glaeser, 
R. La Porta, 
F. Lopez-De-Silanes, 
A. Shleifer 
(2004) 
132 countries 
 (annual data) 
 
 
1960-2000 Standard Cross-
sectional OLS Growth 
Regressions 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), 
Ln RGDP p.c. initial level, Executive 
Constraints, Democracy, Autocracy-
Polity IV, Expropriation Risk, 
Autocracy-Alvarez, Government 
Effectiveness, Judicial Independence, 
Constitutional Review, Plurality, 
Proportional Representation, Years of 
Schooling, Primary School Enrollment, 
Legal Origin, Population 
Environmental Variables 
The evidence suggests that 
human capital is a more basic 
source of growth than are 
institutions, poor countries get 
out of poverty through good 
policies, often pursued by 
dictators, and subsequently 
they improve their political 
institutions. 
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56. D. Landau 
(1986) 
65 countries 
 (annual data) 
 
 
1960-1980 OLS standard growth 
regressions, based on a 
simple production 
function framework, 
with most of the 
regressors being 
lagged in order to 
avoid problems of 
contemporaneous 
correlation between 
the said regressors and 
the disturbance. 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Log RGDP p.c., 
Agriculture production (GDP share), Military expenditure 
(GDP share), General government educational expenditure 
(GDP share), Real exchange rate index 1960, Agricultural 
land p.c., Inflation rate, Private investment (GDP share), 
General government capital expenditure (GDP share), 
Official transfers from abroad (GDP share), Private 
transfers from abroad (GDP share), Current revenue (GDP 
share), Real interest rate, General government current non-
consumption expenditure (GDP share), General 
government budget deficit (GDP share), Colony dummy, 
Coup index, Democracy dummy, Distance from capital of 
nearest seaport, Money supply % change, Terms of trade 
change, Avg. weighted total enrollment in school 1965-75, 
Avg. growth rate of world GDP, Life expectancy at birth 
1970, Total Population, Manufacturing output (GDP 
share), Other industry output (GDP share), General 
government consumption expenditure other than defense 
and education, Oil production dummy, Political deaths 
index, Avg. population growth rate, World inflation rate, 
Avg. annual rainfall, War dummy, Time trend, Years of 
Independence, Population share of Europeans 
The results show that democratic 
institutions, the incidence of coups, 
and a war having been fought on the 
country’s soil all have negative effects 
on the growth rate of the economy. 
World economic conditions affect 
short run but not long run growth. 
Government consumption reduces 
growth. Foreign official aid has no 
effect on growth. 
57. M. Leschke 
(2000) 
80 countries 
 (annual data) 
 
 
1990-1997 Factor analysis of the 
two factors that are 
regressed against 
growth and OLS 
regressions of the 
basic Milton Friedman 
model of production 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln RGDP p.c. initial 
level, Economic freedom index, Political freedom index, 
HDI61 
The results show that the 
appropriateness of the framework in 
which the market operates and the 
degree of political interventions into 
the market process have great 
influence on the prosperity of nations. 
58. J.M. Mbaku 
(1994) 
117 countries 
 (annual data) 
 
 
1970-1989 Standard Panel 
Growth Regressions 
based on a longitudinal 
research design 
estimated with OLS on 
several explanatory 
variables 
Avg. Annual RGNP p.c. Growth (%), PQLI62, HDI, 
Political Democracy Index, Gross Domestic Investment (% 
GDP), Export Growth 
The results show that democracy 
positively affects development as is 
measured by the alternative indicators, 
but it does not have any effect on 
growth in per capita income. 
Democracy affects growth in some 
societies and has no impact at all in 
others. 
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59. R. Levine, 
& 
D. Renelt 
(1992) 
119 countries 
 (annual data) 
 
 
1960-1989 EBA (Extreme 
Bound Analysis) on 
the coefficient of a 
set of core regression 
variables derived 
from a set of 
Standard Cross-
Country Growth 
Regressions 
Growth RGDP p.c. (Summers & Heston), Growth RGDP p.c. 
(World Bank),Black market exchange rate premium (BMP),S.D. 
of BMP, Ratio of central gov. corporate income tax revenue to 
GDP, Ratio of central gov. defense expenditure  to GDP, Ratio of 
central gov. educational expenditure to GDP,  Growth rate of 
domestic credit (GDC), S.D. of GDC, Real gov. capital 
formation, Land area, Share of real gov. consumption 
expenditures without defense and education, Import share of 
GDP, Investment share of GDP, Real investment share of GDP,  
Central gov. gross capital formation, Share of central gov. 
individual income tax revenue to GDP, Real exchange rate 
distortion (RERD), RERD (Summers & Heston), Number of 
revolutions and coups per year, Growth of gov. consumption 
expenditures, Ratio of central gov. deficit to GDP, RGDP1960 
p.c., Outward orientation dummy, Civil liberties, Primary school 
enrollment rate in 1960/1970, Socialist economy dummy,  
Secondary school enrollment rate in 1960/1970,Measure of 
overall trade intervention, Measure of overall trade openness, 
Literacy rate in 1960, Mixed gov. dummy, Growth of import 
share, Population growth, Ratio of import taxes to imports, 
Measure of openness based on import penetration, Gov. 
consumption share of GDP, Real gov. consumption share of 
GDP, Growth of the share of gov. consumption, OECD dummy, 
OPEC dummy, Avg. inflation of GDP deflator, S.D. of inflation, 
Population in 1970, Regional dummies, Growth of exports, Ratio 
of central gov. tax revenue to GDP, Growth of imports, Ratio of 
social security tax revenue to GDP, Ratio of total gov. 
expenditure to GDP, Ratio of total trade to GDP, Growth of 
export share of GDP, Ratio of central gov. export tax revenue to 
exports, Export share of GDP 
The results show a positive 
robust correlation between 
growth and the share of 
investment in GDP and between 
the investment share and the 
ratio of international trade to 
GDP and no correlation with 
political rights. 
60. M.A. Nelson 
& 
R.D. Singh 
(1998) 
67 countries 
 (annual data) 
 
 
1970-1989 Standard cross-
country Growth 
Regressions 
estimated by OLS 
and period FE 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%),  Investment expenditures 
(% GDP), Ln RGDP p.c. initial level, Civil liberties and Political 
rights index, Economic freedom index, Defense expenditures (% 
GDP), Government consumption (% GDP), Government 
revenues and grants (% GDP), Population growth 
The results show that 
democracy is conducive to 
economic growth. Democracy 
is as relevant to growth in poor 
countries as economic freedoms 
are the same as in rich 
countries. 
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61. A.M. Mobarak 
(2005) 
136 countries 
 (annual data) 
 
 
1960-2000 Model of average growth 
and volatility as a two 
equation system 
regressed on several 
explanatory variables and 
estimated with OLS and 
3SLS and R.E. 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), S.D. 
growth rate, IQR growth rate, Frequency of 
sign change of growth rate, Democracy 
indicator, Civil liberties index, Openness of 
political institutions, Competitiveness of 
political participation, Political constraints, 
(Imports+Exports)/GDP, Shock to merchandise 
terms of trade, External war dummy 1960-85, 
Services share of GDP, Exporters of diversified 
set of products indicator, Fuel exporters 
indicator, Log total population, Index of 
fraction of agriculture-industry-services share 
of GDP, School years male/female, Initial 
RGDP p.c., Black market premium in currency 
exchange, Antigovernment demonstrations per 
year, Inflation rate (%), Credit to private 
sector/GDP (%), Gini coefficient of income 
distribution, Gross domestic investment/GDP 
(%), Estimate of settler mortality, Muslim 
majority population country indicator, 
Independence gained after 1945 indicator 
The results show that higher levels 
of democracy and diversification 
lower volatility, whereas volatility 
itself reduces growth. The 
democracy-stability link is robust. 
62. H. Pitlik 
(2002) 
80 countries 
 (annual data) 
 
 
1975-1995 Standard cross-country 
OLS and IRLS growth 
regressions and EBA 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln 
RGDP p.c. initial level, Economic freedom 
1975, Liberalization, Policy volatility, 
Populations growth, Avg. investment 1975-92, 
Human capital, Avg. Political freedom, 
Conflict dummy 1985-94, Regional dummies, 
OECD dummy 
The results show that a higher 
volatility of the liberalization path 
proves to be growth depressing and 
that growth performance is notably 
better if liberalization follows a 
smoother path. 
63. A. Pourgerami 
& 
D. Assane 
(1992) 
47 countries 
 (annual data) 
 
 
1950-1985 Standard cross-country 
OLS growth regressions 
based on the Kormendi-
Meguire model 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln 
RGDP p.c. initial level, Avg. population 
growth rate, S.D. of real output growth, S.D. of 
real money supply shocks, Avg. money supply 
growth, Avg. growth of the ratio of gov. 
spending to output, Avg. growth of exports (% 
output), Avg. growth rate of inflation, Avg. 
ratio investment-income, Civil liberties 
The impact of political freedom on 
economic growth is positive and 
significant. It is more pronounced 
than previously measured. 
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64. K.B. Grier 
& 
G. Tullock 
(1989) 
113 countries 
 (annual data) 
 
 
1951-1980 Pooled Cross-Section Time 
Series Regressions on five-
year averaged data and 
Population-weighted 
Regressions for 4 sub-
samples based on an 
extension of the Kormendi-
Meguire Growth Model 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln RGDP p.c. 
initial level, Growth Government GDP share, S.D. 
GDP Growth, Population Growth, Inflation, Change 
in Inflation, S.D. of Inflation, 5 Year Period 
Dummies, OPEC Dummy, Lack of Civil Liberties 
Dummy 
The results show that political 
repression is negatively correlated 
with economic growth in Africa 
and Central and South America. 
65. H.S. Esfahani 
& 
M.T. Ramirez 
(2003) 
75 countries 
 (annual data) 
 
 
1965-1995 IV/2SLS Regression Analysis 
of a Model of output and 
infrastructure growth 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln RGDP p.c. 
initial level, Population Growth Rate, Log Initial 
Telephones p.c., Growth Rate of telephones p.c., 
Private ownership telecoms sector, Log Initial Power 
Production p.c., Growth Rate of Power Production 
p.c., Private Ownership in Power Sector, Avg. Years 
of Secondary Education, Log of Investment (% 
GDP), Terms of Trade Change, Democracy Score, 
ELH, Centralization, Democracy X ELH, Contract 
Enforcement, Gini Coefficient, Log Population 
Density, Urbanization, Share of Industry in GDP, 
Log (1+ exchange rate black market premium), Log 
Life Expectancy at Birth, Landlocked 
The results show that institutional 
capabilities that lend credibility 
and effectiveness to government 
policy play particularly important 
roles in the development process 
through infrastructure growth. 
66. W. Wu 
& 
O.A. Davis 
(1999) 
100 countries 
 (annual data) 
 
 
1975-1992 Log linear models are applied 
to categorical data and are 
used to analyze contingency 
tables and find the goodness 
of fit for the best model 
which is chosen by the use of 
the forward selection and 
backward elimination process 
Level of Income RGDP p.c. (1975,1980,1985,1990), 
Growth rate RGDP p.c. (1975-80,1980-85,1985-
90,1990-92), Political Freedom measure, Economic 
Freedom measure 
The results show that given 
economic freedom, the rate of 
economic growth is independent of 
political freedom and the level of 
income whereas given the level of 
income, political freedom is 
independent of economic freedom 
and the growth rate. 
67. S. Kosack 
(2003) 
130 countries 
 (annual data) 
 
 
1974-1985 Quality of life growth model 
similar to a neoclassical 
endogenous economic growth 
model estimated with OLS & 
2SLS 
Growth in quality of life (HDI), Initial quality of life, 
Arms imports (lagged), Institutional quality, Region 
Dummies, Period Dummies, Inflation, Budget 
Surplus, Openness, Terms of Trade, 
Democratization, Aid/GDP, Aid/GDP X 
democratization 
The results show that aid increases 
quality-of-life growth in 
democracies and decreases it in 
autocracies. It also seems 
democracies, absent aid, have 
lower quality-of-life growth than 
autocracies. 
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68. J. de Haan 
& 
C.L.J. Siermann 
(1995) 
110 countries 
(annual data) 
1961-1992 EBA of the robustness of the 
relationship between democracy 
and economic growth on a 
Leamer, Levine & Renelt type 
growth model and OLS 
Regression Analysis 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln 
RGDP p.c. initial level, Avg. Investment 
share to GDP, Secondary School 
Enrollment 1960, Avg. Population 
Growth, Avg. Ratio of Real Government 
Consumption to GDP, Avg. Inflation 
Rate, Avg. Ratio of Exports to GDP, 
Political Regime Index 
The main conclusion of this study is 
that the relationship between 
democracy and growth is not robust. 
Regime stability is also not robustly 
related to economic growth. 
Although it is possible to find 
significant relationships, these are 
not robust. Adding one or two other 
variables is generally enough for the 
coefficients to become insignificant. 
69. R.C. Kormendi 
& 
P.G. Meguire 
(1985) 
47 countries 
(annual data) 
1950-1977 Cross-sectional specification of a 
simple growth model where the 
mean growth of real aggregate 
output in country j is regressed 
(OLS) on a vector of explanatory 
variables including civil liberties 
based on certain macroeconomic 
hypotheses 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln 
RGDP p.c. initial level, Avg. population 
growth rate, S.D. of real output growth, 
S.D. of money supply shocks, Avg. 
money supply growth, Avg. growth of the 
ratio of gov. spending to output, Avg. 
growth of exports (% output), Avg. 
growth rate of inflation, Avg. ratio 
investment-income, Civil liberties 
The results show a marginal effect 
of civil liberties (democracy) on 
growth and a dramatic effect on 
investment. 
70. M.J. 
Gasiorowski 
(2000) 
49 countries 
(annual data) 
1968-1991 OLS Regression Analysis with 
two-way FE models based on a 
panel research design in which 
annual time series from a cross-
section of countries are stacked on 
top of one another in a single data 
set and analyzed jointly. 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln 
RGDP p.c. initial level,  Democracy, 
Fiscal Deficit/GDP, Money Supply 
Growth, Real Wage Growth, Employment 
Growth, Domestic Investment, Foreign 
Investment/GNP, Violent Unrest, 
Peaceful Unrest, Trade Deficit/GNP, 
School Enrollment, Inflation All of the 
above are lagged by 1 year except 
democracy which is lagged by 2 years. 
The results show that more 
democratic countries have higher 
inflation and slower growth than 
less democratic countries. New and 
mature democracies do not have 
significantly different inflation and 
growth rates. 
71. A. Libman 
(2012) 
79 regions 
(Russia) 
(annual data) 
2000-2004 OLS and TSLS Regression 
Analysis of  a set of panel data 
based on a basic empirical growth 
model, use of instrumental 
variables and robustness checks 
with FE & RE as well as 3SLS 
Avg. Annual RGRP p.c. Growth (%), Ln 
RGRP p.c. initial level, Oil and Gas, 
Education, Openness, FDI, Investments, 
Health, Temperature, Regional Dummies, 
Democracy, Democracy Squared, 
Bureaucracy 
There is evidence of a non-linear 
relationship between democracy and 
economic growth. Regions with high 
levels of democracy, as well as 
strong autocracies, perform better 
than hybrid regimes. 
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72. J. Krieckhaus 
(2006) 
85 countries 
(annual data) 
1960-2000 OLS Regression Analysis on 
CS63 Data Models & Pooled 
TSCS64 Data Models 
followed by sensitivity 
analyses 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln RGDP 
p.c. initial level, Ln Life Expectancy, Education, 
Population Growth, Climate, Institutions, 
Democracy, Trade Openness, Government 
Spending, Labor Force, Initial GDP squared, 
Investment 
The results show that democracy has 
no influence on economic growth. 
The main conclusion of this study is 
that democratic governance constrains 
growth in Latin America and Asia yet 
facilitates growth in Africa. 
Sensitivity analyses indicate that these 
findings are fairly robust. 
73. M.A. Baum 
& 
D.A. Lake 
(2003) 
128 countries 
(annual data) 
1967-1997 Recursive Regression 
Analysis of Indirect Effect 
of Democracy on Growth by 
the use of 2 equations on 
TSCS Data Models and the 
use of country-specific FE 
on all models 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln RGDP 
p.c. initial level, Democracy, Labor Force, 
Female Life Expectancy, Female Secondary 
Enrollment, Investment, Population 
The results show that democracy has 
no statistically significant direct effect 
on growth but rather it has a largely 
indirect effect on growth through 
increased life expectancy in poor 
countries and increased secondary 
education in non-poor countries. 
74. Y. Feng 
(1997) 
96 countries 
(annual data) 
1960-1980 OLS Regression Analysis on 
a single Growth equation 
and Joint Estimation of 
Growth, Democracy and 
Government Change with 
3SLS Regression Analysis 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln RGDP 
p.c. initial level, Initial Elementary School 
Enrollment Rate, Initial Investment Level, 
Inflation, Trade, Democracy, Irregular Change, 
Major Regime Change, Minor Regime Change 
The results show that democracy has a 
positive indirect effect upon growth 
through its impacts on the 
probabilities of both regime change 
and constitutional government change 
from one ruling party to another. It 
promotes macro-political certainty and 
micro-political adjustability which 
leads to sustainable economic growth. 
75. D.P. Quinn 
& 
J.T. Woolley 
(2001) 
109 countries 
(annual data) 
1974-1989 OLS Regression Analysis on 
a Barro based cross-
sectional growth model 
followed by EBA to assess 
the robustness of the results 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln RGDP 
p.c. initial level, Growth Volatility (1974-89),  
Investment, Population Growth, Secondary 
School Enrollment, Primary School Enrollment, 
Trade Openness, Index of Democracy, Change in 
Democracy Index (1974-89), Government 
Consumption, Growth of Government Share, 
Revolutions/Coups, Political Instability Index  
(1974-89), Growth of Domestic Credit, S.D. of 
Domestic Credit, Export Share Growth, Regional 
Dummies 
The results show that when growth 
and volatility are jointly examined, 
democracies reveal highly favorable 
economic results. However, 
democracy is not a robust correlate of 
economic growth. 
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76. X.X. Sala-i-Martin 
(1997) 
119 countries 
(annual data) 
1960-1992 CDF65 Analysis on the 
beta coefficient of a 
set of core regression 
variables derived from 
a set of Standard 
Cross-Country Growth 
Regressions 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Equipment 
Investment, Number of years open economy, Fraction 
Confucian, Rule of Law, Fraction Muslim, Political Rights, 
L.A.66 Dummy, S.S.A. Dummy, Civil Liberties, Revolutions 
and Coups, Fraction of GDP in Mining, S.D. Black Market 
Premium, Primary Exports 1970, Degree of Capitalism, 
War Dummy, Non-Equipment Investment, Absolute 
Latitude, Exchange Rate Distortions, Fraction Protestant, 
Fraction Catholic, Fraction Buddhist, Spanish Colony 
The results show that a 
substantial number of variables 
including civil liberties are 
found to be strongly related to 
growth. 
77. M. Lundberg 
& 
L. Squire 
(2003) 
49 countries 
(annual data) 
1960-1997 Pooled OLS (SURE), 
IV (3SLS), Keane and 
Rankle 3SLS on a base 
growth model, a 
structural growth 
model, and a quasi-
reduced-form growth 
model 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Gini coefficient, 
Education, M2/GDP, Inflation, Gov. Exp./GDP, Terms of 
Trade change, S-W openness index, Civil Liberties, Mean 
Land Gini, Initial GDP p.c., 1980s Dummy, 1990s Dummy, 
Initial Education, Initial Gov. Exp., Initial Inflation, Initial 
M2/GDP, Initial Terms of Trade change, Initial Civil 
Liberties, Initial S-W openness, Lagged Terms of Trade 
change, Population, Urban share of population, Ln life 
expectancy at birth, Ln total fertility rate, Initial female 
literacy rate, Initial democracy, Mean arable area, Oil 
exporter dummy, Commodity exporter dummy, British-
French-German-Scandinavian legal origin 
The main result is to show that 
the determinants of growth and 
inequality are not mutually 
exclusive. 
Another result is that 
improving income distribution 
through enhancing civil 
liberties may have deleterious 
consequences for growth. 
78. P. Collier 
(1999) 
23 countries 
(annual data) 
1960-1990 Basic OLS Regression 
Analysis of economic 
growth on ethnic 
fractionalization and 
democracy 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln RGDP p.c. initial 
level, Ln Population, Landlocked, ELF, Political Rights 
The main result is that 
democracy raises the growth 
rate while ethnic 
fractionalization reduces it. 
79. W.K. Farr, 
R. A. Lord, 
J. L. Wolfenbarger 
(1998) 
98 countries 
 (annual data) 
(5-year avg.) 
 
1980-1990 Basic OLS Regression 
Analysis of economic 
growth on Political 
and Economic 
Freedom using 9 
equations set up to 
measure the Granger 
Causality of the 3 main 
variables on each other 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln RGDP p.c. initial 
level lagged, Political Freedom, Economic Freedom, 
country dummy variables 
The results indicate that the 
level of economic well-being 
Granger-causes political 
freedom while no reciprocating 
evidence is found that political 
freedom Granger-causes the 
level of economic well-being, 
implying a univariate line of 
causation. 
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80. W.J. Henisz 
(2000) 
157 countries 
(annual data) 
1960-1994 Use of a simple spatial model 
of political interaction 
between different branches of 
government with veto power 
in economic decisions and 
estimation of the variable 
derived from this model with 
OLS, 3SLS, and GMM 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln RGDP p.c. initial 
level lagged, Male Secondary Education (years), Female 
Secondary Education (years), Log Life Expectancy, Log 
Fertility Rate, Government Consumption (% GDP), Log Black 
Market Exchange Premium, Change in the Terms of Trade, 
Total Investment (% GDP), Log Law & Order Index, No. of 
changes in the Identity of the Executive, Democracy Index, 
Political Constraint Index 
The derived political 
interaction variable is 
found to have 
statistically and 
economically significant 
impact on growth rates. 
81. U. Heo 
& 
A. C. Tan 
(2001) 
32 countries 
(annual data) 
1950-1982 Use of the direct Granger 
Causality Method 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln RGDP p.c. initial 
level lagged, Democracy Index 
The results are unclear 
about the causal 
relationship between 
economic growth and the 
level of democracy. 
82. K. L. Gupta 
(1988) 
47 countries 
(annual data) 
1950-1977 Use of the Kormendi-
Meguire model disaggregated 
in 2 groups of developed and 
developing countries 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln RGDP p.c. initial 
level, Avg. population growth rate, S.D. of real output growth, 
S.D. of money supply shocks, Avg. money supply growth, Avg. 
growth of the ratio of gov. spending to output, Avg. growth of 
exports (% output), Avg. growth rate of inflation, Avg. ratio 
investment-income, Civil liberties 
The results of this study 
show that there are 
fundamental differences 
in the macro- 
determinants of growth 
in the developing and the 
developed countries. 
83. D.K. Gupta, 
M. C. Madhavan, 
A. Blee 
(1998) 
120 countries 
 (annual data) 
 
 
1965-1986 Basic Pooled Time Series 
OLS Regression Analysis on 
5 equations with 5 different 
dependent variables regressed 
on the rest of the variables 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Democracy Index, 
Communist Dummy, Coercion applied by democratic 
countries, Gap between expected and observed levels of 
democracy, Coercion applied by non-democratic countries, 
Enrollment in primary education, Size of the government 
sector, Percentage of government sector to the GDP, Average 
national investment as a percentage of GDP, Dummy variable 
for Latin American countries, Dummy variable for Middle 
Eastern countries, Openness (export + import as a percentage 
of GDP), Political violence, Political violence in the year prior 
to the three study periods, Ratio of income shares of the top 
20% to the bottom 20% of the population, Rate of growth of 
GDP per capita, Dummy variable for South Asian countries, 
Dummy variable for Southeast Asian countries, Dummy 
variable for Sub-Saharan African countries (excluding South 
Africa), Ratio of a nation's per capita GDP to the US GDP 
The estimated results 
indicate that democracy 
is more conducive to 
economic growth, at 
least in the long run. 
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84. D.A. Leblang 
(1997) 
70 countries 
(annual data) 
1960-1989 OLS estimation of economic 
growth models 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%) Decadal, Ln RGDP 
p.c. initial level, Democracy Index, Primary School Index 
(% over total population), Secondary School Index (% 
over total population), Regulation of chief executive Index, 
Competitiveness of chief executive election Index, 
Openness of executive recruitment Index,  Executive 
Constraints Index, Revolutions/Coups Index 
Results show that a nation's 
initial level of democracy has 
a significant and positive 
effect on its subsequent rate 
of growth. 
85. S. Knack 
& 
P. Keefer 
(1995) 
97 countries 
(annual data) 
1974-1989 Use of the Barro Growth 
Model estimated with OLS 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Avg. annual private 
investment/GDP, Ln RGDP p.c. 1970, Democracy Index, 
Avg. annual government consumption/GDP, Absolute 
value of deviation of investment price level (relative to 
U.S. level) from sample mean, Deviation of investment 
price level (relative to U.S. level) from sample mean, 
ICRG variables, BERI variables 
One conclusion is that 
institutions that protect 
property rights are crucial to 
economic growth and to 
investment and so democracy 
has an indirect effect on 
growth. 
86. M. Lindenberg 
& 
S. Devarajan 
(1993) 
93 countries 
(annual data) 
1973-1988 Use of a FE model of GDP 
growth and regime type 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Investment/GDP, 
Inflation, Current Account/GDP, Democracy Dummies 
The results showed that 
democracies in developing 
countries actually 
demonstrated stronger 
economic performance than 
their authoritarian 
counterparts. 
87. H. Li 
& 
H. Zou 
(1998) 
46 countries 
 (annual data) 
 
 
1947-1994 FE & RE estimation of an 
extension of the Alesina and 
Rodrik baseline regression 
model 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln RGDP p.c. initial 
level, Democracy Index, Gini Index, Urbanization Ratio, 
Population Growth Rate, Financial Development 
(M2/GDP), Openness (Exports/GDP), Domestic 
Investment shares of GDP, Black Market Premium, 
Primary School Enrollment Ratio 
The results have shown that 
income inequality 
is positively, and very often 
even significantly, associated 
with economic growth. 
88. E. Miguel, 
S. Satyanath, 
E. Sergenti 
(2004) 
41 countries 
(Africa) 
 (annual data) 
 
 
1981-1999 OLS, IV-2SLS, IV-2SLS FE 
estimation of economic 
growth models 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Avg. Annual RGDP 
p.c. Growth (%) lagged, Ln RGDP p.c. initial level, Civil 
Conflict Indices, Annual Rainfall (mm) GPCP measure, 
Annual Growth in Rainfall, Annual Growth in Rainfall 
Lagged, Democracy Level Lagged, Democracy Indicator 
Lagged, ELF, RF67, Oil-Exporting Country, Log 
Mountainous, Log National Population Lagged, Trade 
Growth 
Using rainfall shocks as 
instrumental variables for 
economic growth, the results 
show that growth shocks have 
a dramatic causal impact on 
the likelihood of civil war 
regardless of the political 
regime in place. 
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89. P.H. Mo 
(2000) 
83 countries 
(annual data) 
1970-1985 IV-2SLS estimation of 
economic growth models 
based on a total factor 
productivity framework 
developed by the author 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln RGDP p.c. 
initial level, GINI coefficient, Year the GINI 
coefficient is calculated, Private Investment/GDP, 
Population Growth Rate, Gastil Index of Political 
Rights, Measure of Political Instability, Avg. schooling 
years in the total population over age 25, Government 
Transfers/GDP, Regional Dummies 
The study concludes that income 
inequality has significant 
negative effect on the growth 
rate. 
90. P.H. Mo 
(2001) 
46 countries 
(annual data) 
1970-1985 OLS estimation of 
economic growth models 
based on a total factor 
productivity framework 
developed by the author 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln RGDP p.c. 
initial level, Corruption Index, Private 
Investment/GDP, Population Growth Rate, Gastil Index 
of Political Rights, Measure of Political Instability, 
Avg. schooling years in the total population over age 
25 
The results show that a 1% 
increase in the corruption level 
reduces the growth rate by about 
0.72%. The most important 
channel through which 
corruption affects economic 
growth is political instability, 
which accounts for about 53% of 
the overall effect. 
91. M. Α. Oliva 
& 
L. A. Rivera-Batiz 
(2002) 
119 countries 
(annual data) 
1970-1994 Use of a benchmark 
growth model applicable 
to developing countries 
estimated in several 
different combinations of 
equations with different 
variables with OLS, 3SLS 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln RGDP p.c. 
initial level, Schooling, Government Consumption, 
Investment, FDI, KF68, OKF69, TOT-TOT70(-1), 
Democracy Index, Rule of Law, Regional Dummies, 
Chronological Dummies, Log Black Market Premium, 
Log Inflation, Avg. Capital Growth, Avg. Bank Assets, 
Avg. Private Credit 
The direct growth effects of 
democracy are positive and often 
statistically significant. There is 
also evidence that democracy has 
indirect growth effects that work 
by encouraging schooling and 
that the rule of law influences 
growth indirectly by encouraging 
foreign direct investment. 
92. T. Persson 
& 
G. Tabellini 
(1994) 
9 countries 
(highly- 
industrialized) 
(20 yr. intervals) 
 
56 countries 
 (annual data) 
 
 
1830-1950 
 
 
 
 
1960-1985 
Use of a theoretical model 
that relates equilibrium 
growth to income 
inequality and political 
institutions. Standard 
Growth Regressions 
estimated with OLS & 
2SLS on income 
distribution and on other 
explanatory variables. 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln RGDP p.c. 
initial level, Share in personal income of the top 20 
percent of the population, Share of the enfranchised age 
and sex group in the population that is not in the 
electorate, Schooling Index, GDPGAP, Share in 
income of the third quintile, Share of the relevant age 
group attending primary school, Democracy Dummy 
The main theoretical result is 
that income inequality is harmful 
for growth. Empirical results 
show that equality affects growth 
by promoting investment, and 
this effect is present only in 
democracies. 
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93. A. Pourgerami 
(1992) 
104 countries 
(annual data) 
1965-1984 3SLS estimation of a system 
of simultaneous equations of 
3 over-identified equations of 
development-democracy-
growth that include 3 jointly 
determined and 8 
predetermined variables 
Growth (DRR71), Growth (GDP), Democracy, 
Freedom, Human Rights, Development (PQLI), 
Development (GNP), Stability, Religion, 
Industrialization, Family, Self-Determination 
The effects of Democracy, Freedom, 
or Human Rights on Growth are 
positive and significant in equations 
where the DRR is the dependent 
variable. When Growth is measured 
by the GDP growth rate, only 
coefficients of the Human Rights 
variable are significantly different 
from zero. 
94. K.L. Remmer 
(1990) 
11 countries 
(S. America + 
Mexico) 
(annual data) 
1982-1988 Statistical Analysis of pooled 
data 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Log Annual 
% change in Rate of Inflation, Rate of Change 
Debt/Exports, Rate of Change Gov. Deficit/GDP, 
Real Wages (annual % change), Unemployment 
Rate, Debt/Exports, Interest Payments/Exports, 
Annual % change purchasing power of exports, 
1982 Debt/Export 
The results although mixed do 
provide some basis for arguing that 
a shift to democracy can actually 
strengthen, rather than weaken, the 
capacity to cope with economic 
challenges. 
95. R. Perotti 
(1996) 
67 countries 
 (annual data) 
 
 
1960-1985 OLS & 2SLS estimation of 
economic growth models 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln RGDP p.c. 
initial level, Share in income of the third and fourth 
quintiles 1960, Share in income of the third quintile 
1960, Avg. years of secondary schooling of the 
male population 1960, Avg. years of secondary 
schooling of the female population 1960, PPP value 
of the investment deflator (U.S.A.) 1960, Avg. share 
of gov. expenditure on social security and welfare in 
GDP, Avg. share of gov. expenditure on health and 
housing in GDP, Avg. share of gov. expenditure on 
education in GDP, Avg. marginal tax rate, Avg. 
share of labor taxation in GDP, Avg. share of 
income taxes in personal income, Urbanization Rate 
1965, Avg. share of population over 65, Avg. male 
secondary school enrollment ratio, Avg. female 
secondary school enrollment ratio, Avg. net fertility 
rate, Life expectancy at birth 1960, % of the 
population belonging to the main ethnic or linguistic 
group, Indices of sociopolitical instability, 
Democracy Dummies, Regional Dummies, Rich 
country Dummy 
The results link income distribution 
to sociopolitical instability and to 
the education/fertility decision. 
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96. G.W. Scully 
(1988) 
115 countries 
(annual data) 
1960-1980 OLS regressions relating 
the separate effects of 
institutional variables on 
economic growth 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Compound Growth (%), 
Compound growth rate in the capital-labor ratio, 
Politically Open Dummy, Politically Closed Dummy, 
Individual Rights Dummy, State Rights Dummy, Free 
Market Dummy, Command Economy Dummy 
The results showed that the 
institutional framework has 
significant and large effects on 
the efficiency and growth rate of 
economies. 
97. J. Svensson 
(1999) 
58 countries 
(annual data) 
1970-1994 OLS & IV-2SLS pooled 
cross-country growth 
regressions 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln RGDP p.c. 
initial level, Democracy Index, Regional Dummies, Aid 
Index, Arm Imports/Total Imports, Religious Indices, 
Distortion Index, Financial Depth Index, FZ72 Dummy, 
Education Gap Index, Log Total Population 1970, ELF 
Index, Fiscal Surplus/GDP, Schooling Index, Policy 
Index 
The results show that the long-
run growth impact of aid is 
conditional on the degree of 
political and civil liberties in the 
recipient country. Aid has a 
positive impact on growth in 
more democratic countries. 
98. L. A. Rivera-Batiz 
(2002) 
59 countries 
(annual data) 
1960-1990 OLS estimation of cross 
country economic growth 
models based on a total 
factor productivity 
framework developed by 
the author 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.w. Growth (%), Capital Stock 
per worker, Democracy Index, Avg. yrs. of schooling 
(population over 15), Avg. proportion of 1960-90 
population attending tertiary education (over 15), 
Governance Index, Urbanization Index (1980), Log of 
1960-90 change in Capital Stock per worker 
The results show that democracy 
is in fact a significant 
determinant of total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth 
between 1960 and 1990 in a 
cross-section of countries. 
Democracy influences growth 
mainly through its strong 
positive effects on the quality of 
governance. 
99. E. Weede 
(1983) 
94 countries 
(annual data) 
1960-1979 Cross-national and cross-
sectional multiple OLS 
regression analysis 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln RGNP p.c. 
initial level, Avg. Annual RGNP p.c. Growth (%), 
Democracy Index, Ln RGNP p.c. initial level squared, 
Primary School Enrollment 1960, Secondary School 
Enrollment 1960,Gross Domestic Investment (% GDP), 
Military Participation Ratio Index 
 
 
 
 
The overall effect of political 
democracy on economic growth 
is negative, but rather weak. 
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Table 1 continued: Literature review of studies concerning Democracy & Economic Growth 
Index Authors Countries Period Method Variables Empirical Results 
100. E. Weede 
(1993) 
129 countries 
(annual data) 
1975-1986 Simple Panel OLS regression 
analysis 
Avg. Annual RGNP p.c. Growth (%) 1980-87, Ln RGNP 
p.c. 1980, Ln RGNP p.c. 1980 squared, Secondary 
School Enrollment 1980,Gross Domestic Investment (% 
GDP), Regime Repressiveness 1980-86, Nearly Stable 
Regime Repressiveness 1980-86, Stable Regime 
Repressiveness 1980-86, 
 
 
 
 
There are no significant 
effects of democracy or 
repressiveness on either the 
quality of life, or income 
inequality, or economic 
growth rates. 
101. B. L. Chen 
(2003) 
43 countries 
(annual data) 
1970-1992 OLS long-run growth 
regressions 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln RGDP p.c. 
initial level, Physical Capital Input, Human Capital Input, 
BMP, Government Consumption (share of GDP), 
Inflation Rate, Civil Liberties Index, Regional Dummies, 
GINI coefficient, Year the GINI coefficient is calculated 
The results show an 
inverted-U relationship 
between income 
distribution and long-run 
economic growth. 
102. E. Papaioannou 
& 
G. Siourounis 
(2008) 
166 countries 
(annual data) 
1960-2003 Pooled cross-sectional OLS 
estimates with Time FE and 
Country FE of 7 variations of 
the benchmark difference-in-
difference growth model to 
check for unconditional 
effects of permanent 
democratizations and use of 
an ARDL model to check for 
conditional effects of 
democratization 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln RGDP p.c. 
initial level (PPP), Democratization Dummy, Gross 
Capital Formation/GDP, Avg. yrs. schooling of 
population over 25, Life Expectancy at Birth, 
Government Consumption (share of GDP), Trade 
[(Imports+Exports)/GDP], Socialist Indicator 
The panel estimates imply 
that on average 
democratizations are 
associated with a 1% 
increase in annual per 
capita growth. The 
dynamic analysis reveals 
that: while during the 
transition growth is slow, 
in the medium and long run 
it stabilizes at a higher 
level. 
103. J. L. Butkiewicz 
& 
H. Yanikkaya 
(2006) 
100 countries 
(annual data) 
1970-1999 SUR/3SLS Panel cross-
country growth regressions of 
an empirical growth model 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln RGDP p.c. 
initial level, Log Life Expectancy Rates, Telephone 
mainlines/worker, Trade(% GDP), Rule of Law Dummy, 
Gov. Repudiation of Contracts Dummy, Risk of 
Expropriation Dummy, Corruption Dummy, Bureaucratic 
Quality Dummy, Political Rights Dummy, Civil Liberties 
Dummy, Democracy Dummy, Autocracy Dummy, 
Political Regime Dummy, Regional Dummies, Secondary 
Enrollment Ratios, ELF Index 
The results show that 
countries with democratic 
institutions do enjoy 
superior growth 
performance especially 
developing ones. 
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Table 1 continued: Literature review of studies concerning Democracy & Economic Growth 
Index Authors Countries Period Method Variables Empirical Results 
104. S. Santhirasegaram 
(2007) 
70 countries 
(annual data) 
2000-2004 Simple Pooled OLS 
regression Analysis of a 
neoclassical growth model 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln RGDP p.c. 
initial level, Avg. Investment Expenditure (% GDP), 
Avg. Tertiary Education Enrollments (% Gross 
Enrollments), Democracy Index (Polity IV), Economic 
Freedom Index (Heritage Foundation) 
The results show a negative 
relationship between 
democratic freedom and 
growth. 
105. C.H.Knutsen 
(2015) 
184 countries 
(annual data) 
1825-2008 OLS PCSE-FE 2SLS- RE  
2SLS Regressions of a 
baseline growth model in 
different specifications 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln RGDP p.c. 
initial level, Log Population, Log (Regime Duration+1), 
Polity Index, ELF Index, Regional Dummies, Country 
Dummies, Decade Dummies, Year Dummies, 
Colonization Dummies, Plurality of Religion Dummies 
The study reports robust 
evidence that democracy 
increases not only technology-
induced growth but also net 
economic growth rates. 
106. S. Commander 
& 
Z. Nikoloski 
(2011) 
159 countries 
(annual data) 
1960-2009 GMM, OLS & FE 
Regression Analysis of a 
growth model 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Lagged Avg. 
Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Ln RGDP p.c. initial 
level (PPP), Life Expectancy, Trade Openness, Inflation, 
Population, Gross Secondary School Enrollment, 
Government Expenditure, Democracy (FH), Democracy 
Sq. (FH), Polity, Polity Sq., Polity Transformed, Polity 
Transformed Sq., Regime Durability, Democracy 
(Cheibub), Interaction between Polity and Durability 
The results showed that none of 
the explanatory variables for 
political institutions were 
significant for growth. 
107. K. Jamali 
K. Wandschneider 
P. V. Wunnava 
(2007) 
92 countries 
(annual data) 
1990-1999 Pooled cross-section time 
series analysis of a new 
neoclassical growth model 
checked in 2 
specifications estimated 
with OLS Regressions 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%),Ln RGDP p.c. 
initial level (1995 U.S. $), Gross Secondary School 
Enrollment, Computers per 1000 people, Domestic 
Credit to Private Sector (% GDP), Autocracy Dummy, 
Democracy Dummy, Bureaucracy Dummy 
The results suggest that 
democracies and bureaucracies 
significantly outperform 
autocracies in economic 
growth. 
108. T. Gylfason 
(2008) 
164 countries 
(annual data) 
1960-2000 OLS cross-country 
regressions of a basic 
growth model in different 
specifications 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Initial Level GNI 
p.c., Natural Capital Share, Natural Capital per person, 
Democracy Index, Log Investment Rate, Log School 
Life Expectancy, Fertility, Subsoil Asset Share, Subsoil 
Assets per person 
The results show that political 
diversification is good for 
growth because it redistributes 
political power from narrowly 
based ruling elites to the 
people, thus in many cases 
replacing an extended 
monopoly of often ill-gotten 
power by democracy and 
pluralism. Diversity is good for 
growth. 
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Table 1 continued: Literature review of studies concerning Democracy & Economic Growth 
Index Authors Countries Period Method Variables Empirical Results 
109. J. T. Jalles 
(2010) 
86 countries 
(annual data) 
1960-2005 Simple Pooled OLS-FE-
TSLS regression analysis 
of a growth model based 
on a large panel 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%),Ln RGDP p.c. 
initial level, Primary School Enrollment, Secondary 
School Enrollment, Higher Education School 
Enrollment, Democracy Index, Autocracy Index, 
Polity2 Index, Political Instability Index, Openness, 
Investment (GFCF73), Democracy X rich, Democracy 
X poor, Polity2 X rich, Polity2 X poor, Sustained 
Democratic Transition, Sustained Autocratic 
Transition, Small Regime Changes, Regime 
Durability, Latitude, Ethnic Fragmentation 
The results show a positive and 
statistically significant effect of 
democracy and human capital on 
economic growth. A final 
conclusion can be reached that 
electoral democracy, by itself, 
increases GDP growth per capita 
while almost no support is found 
for the hypothesis that autocracy, 
by itself, increases it. 
110. A. Aisen 
& 
F. J. Veiga 
(2013) 
169 countries 
(annual data) 
1960-2004 System GMM estimations 
of linear dynamic panel 
models based on a dynamic 
growth model 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%),Ln RGDP p.c. 
initial level, Investment (% GDP), Population 
Growth, Primary School Enrollment, Trade 
Openness (% GDP), Cabinet Changes, Inflation Rate, 
Government (% GDP), Economic Freedom Index, 
Ethnic Homogeneity Index, Polity IV, Physical 
Capital Growth, Log Physical Capital p.c., TFP 
Growth, Log TFP, Human Capital Growth, Log 
Human Capital p.c., Regime Instability Indices, 
Violence Indices, Legal Structure and Security of 
Property Rights 
The results show that higher 
degrees of political instability are 
associated with lower growth 
rates of GDP per capita. 
Political instability adversely 
affects growth by lowering the 
rates of productivity growth and, 
to a smaller degree, physical and 
human capital accumulation. 
Finally, economic freedom and 
ethnic homogeneity are beneficial 
to growth, while democracy may 
have a small negative effect. 
111. J. R. Pozuelo 
A. Slipowitz 
G. Vuletin 
(2016) 
171 countries 
(annual data) 
1960-1996 Pooled cross-sectional 
OLS estimates with Time 
FE and Country FE of 
several variations of the 
benchmark growth model 
Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. Growth (%), Bureaucracy 
Quality Index, Checks and Balances Index, 
Contestation in a Democracy Index, Democratization 
Dummy, Democratic Accountability Index, 
Economic Complexity Index, E-timi74, Education, 
Empowerment Rights Index, Gini Index, Government 
Spending (% GDP), Life Expectancy at birth, HDI, 
Inclusiveness in a Democracy, Gross Capital 
Formation (% GDP), Polity2, NAVCO75, Openness, 
Physical Integrity Rights Index, TFP, Terms of 
Trade, World Press Freedom Index 
The results show that the behavior 
of economic growth following 
exogenous democratizations 
strongly indicates that democracy 
does not cause growth. 
Consequently, the common 
positive association between 
democracy and economic growth 
is driven by endogenous 
democratization episodes. 
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3. Econometric Methodology 
3.1 Methodology of Meta-Analysis 
  
This paper has as its main objective to investigate the existence of a real association between 
democracy and economic growth and whether there is indeed an inconclusive association as many 
authors assert. Second, it investigates the presence of publication bias and assesses its impact on the 
analysis. Finally, it explores the sources of heterogeneity in the published results. Why are there such 
seemingly divergent results reported among different studies? Where does the heterogeneity of results 
come from? Does it come from the data-generating process, the research design process or is it 
unexplained? If it comes from the data-generating process then this implies that there is an underlying 
distribution of democracy-growth population parameter values which are negative in certain situations 
and positive in others. If it comes from the research design process then this implies that reported 
differences result from issues, such as differences in econometric specification. Lastly, if it is 
unexplained then this means that we probably still need to further analyze our data with different models 
based on different combinations of covariates until we find a satisfactory explanation. 
In order to identify the magnitude of the democracy growth association, we calculate a mean 
democracy growth effect from the literature and construct 95% confidence intervals around this mean. 
This measure is the weighted average of a standardized democracy-growth effect derived from each 
study. In this paper, the partial correlation is used as the standardized effect. Partial correlations measure 
the impact of democracy on growth keeping other factors constant76. They can also be used for 
meaningful comparisons across studies. An alternative would be to use elasticities, but many studies do 
not provide enough information from which to calculate the respected elasticities. 
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It is also prudent to weight the partial correlations. A standard weight in meta-analysis is the 
sample size of the regression from which the partial correlation is derived, as sample size affects the 
amount of information that is offered. The weights used in our meta-analysis are based mainly on the 
sample size of each study included in the analysis for our Fixed Effects Model whereas the calculation of 
the weights for the Random Effects Model also includes the variance of the dispersion between studies. 
Thus, the mean democracy-growth effect by encompassing all the aspects of democracy-growth studies 
that are represented with a standardized measure and weighted appropriately with a corresponding 
suitable indicator can be regarded as the best estimate of the entire empirical literature on the effect that 
democracy has on growth. The mean democracy-growth effect helps us answer two important questions: 
(a) whether democracy has a positive or negative effect on economic growth on the average, and (b) 
whether the democracy-growth effect is small or large. For instance, the mean democracy-growth effect 
may be positive but too small to be of economic significance. Most researchers follow Cohen’s (1988) 
guidelines and regard the mean effect to be small if its absolute value is less than 0.10, medium if it is 
0.25, and large if it is greater than 0.4  
It is also desirable to try to detect the presence of publication bias that might explain the existence 
of a large combined or mean effect size. We use a series of tests to detect any publication bias for 
robustness purposes. The plot by precision is the traditional form. We use the funnel plot of precision by 
Fisher’s Z77. Note that large studies appear toward the top of the graph, and tend to cluster near the mean 
effect size. Smaller studies appear toward the bottom of the graph, and (since there is more random 
variation in the small studies) are dispersed across a range of values. This pattern tends to resemble a 
funnel, which is the basis for the plot’s name. In the absence of publication bias the studies will be 
distributed symmetrically about the combined effect size. By contrast, in the presence of bias, the bottom 
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of the plot would tend to show a higher concentration of studies on one side of the mean than the other. 
This would reflect the fact that smaller studies (which appear toward the bottom) are more likely to be 
published if they have larger than average effects, which makes them more likely to meet the criterion 
for statistical significance. 
Another test we use to determine if there is any publication bias is Duval and Tweedie’s Trim and 
Fill (2000). Trim and Fill builds on the key idea behind the funnel plot; that in the absence of bias the 
plot would be symmetric about the summary effect. If there are more small studies on the right than on 
the left, the concern is that studies may be missing from the left. The Trim and Fill procedure imputes 
these missing studies, adds them to the analysis, and then re-computes the summary effect size. The 
more the missing studies the more the publication bias. 
Another way to try to detect the presence of publication bias is Begg and Mazumdar’s rank 
correlation test, which reports the rank correlation (Kendall’s tau) between the standardized effect size 
and the variances (or standard errors) of these effects. Tau would be interpreted much the same way as 
any correlation, with a value of zero indicating no relationship between effect size and precision, and 
deviations from zero indicating the presence of a relationship. If asymmetry is caused by publication bias 
we would expect to see high standard errors (small studies) associated with larger effect sizes. If larger 
effects are represented by low values, tau would be positive, while if larger effects are represented by 
high values, tau would be negative. Since asymmetry could appear in the reverse direction, the 
significance test is two-sided. 
The next test we use to check for publication bias is Egger’s linear regression method. Like the 
rank correlation test it quantifies the bias captured by the funnel plot. While Begg and Mazumdar’s test 
uses ranks, Egger’s method uses the actual values of the effect sizes and their precision.  
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In the Egger test, the standardized effect (effect size divided by standard error) is regressed on 
precision (inverse of standard error). Small studies generally have a precision close to zero, due to their 
high standard error. In the absence of bias we would expect to see such studies associated with small 
standardized effects. We would expect to see large studies associated with large standardized effects. 
This would create a regression line whose intercept approached the origin. If the intercept deviates from 
this expectation, publication bias may be the cause. This would occur, for instance, when small studies 
are disproportionately associated with larger effect sizes. As was true for the rank correlation test, the 
significance test should be two-tailed. 
Finally, the last test used to detect any publication bias is Rosenthal’s Fail-safe N test, which 
computes the number of missing studies (with mean effect of zero) that would need to be added to the 
analysis to yield a statistically insignificant overall effect. The greater the number of these studies the 
less publication bias we might have. If the number of these studies is very small then that is an indication 
that we might have a very large publication bias. 
A fixed effects meta-analysis model is appropriate when there is a common democracy growth 
effect that all studies are estimating. In such a situation, the only reasons why study results will differ are 
(a) sampling error and (b) systematic differences due to the research process. In a random effects meta-
analysis model, study differences result from both sampling error as well as random differences between 
studies. The random effects model is appropriate if a subsample of empirical studies is used in a meta-
analysis (as opposed to the entire population) and if the source of differences between studies cannot be 
identified. In a mixed effects model there are both random differences as well as systematic differences 
between studies. In the results section of this article, several of the moderator variables are identified that 
capture systematic (nonrandom) differences between studies. It is shown there that a fixed effects model 
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captures adequately the distribution of the findings of the empirical democracy-growth literature and that 
the variation in reported results is not due to random differences between studies. 
 
3.2 Methodology of MRA 
  
In this paper we run 4 Fixed Effects models (regressions) and 4 Random Effects models 
(regressions) for both the ALL SET and BEST SET data samples. 
In the FE Model 1 and the RE Model 1 we use the following set of covariates: Cross-section 
Pooled Data, Panel Data, NoYears, Single, Politics, Primary, Crossauthor, Prior, lgoog_pa, Year. 
These models will tell us if the democracy-growth effect depends on certain data characteristics or 
on the accumulated knowledge that the researcher had at his disposal.  
In the FE Model 2 and the RE Model 2 we use the following set of covariates: LA, Africa, Asia, 
Developed, 1970’s, 1980’s, 1990’s, 2000’s, 2010’s, NoCountries. 
These models will tell us if the democracy-growth effect depends on certain regional data 
characteristics or on certain chronological ones. 
In the FE Model 3 and the RE Model 3 we use the following set of covariates: Gastil, Dem. 
Dummy, DemoSq, Region, Ecofreedom, Inequality, Instability, Population, HC, PC. 
These models will tell us if the democracy-growth effect depends on certain measures used to 
capture the presence and the degree of democracy in the different studies or passes through certain 
socioeconomic channels. 
In the FE Model 4 and the RE Model 4 we use the following set of covariates: Non-OLS, OLS, 
Endogenous, Inflation, Convergence, Openness, Govt. Size, lagdep, lags, and time. 
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These models will tell us if the democracy-growth effect depends on certain estimation 
characteristics, the use of certain dynamic measures or passes through certain macroeconomic channels. 
All of the above models will also tell us if there is any unexplained variance of the true effects 
remaining. 
4. Data Analysis 
4.1 Data 
We kept 75 out of the 84 primary studies that Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu used in their meta-analysis 
and we added another 35. There were actually more than a total of 110 studies exploring democracy and 
growth. However, we decided to use only those studies whose results were comparable. The selection 
criteria are similar to those used by Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu and are as follows. First, we included 
all of the primary studies used in Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu’s meta-analysis that we could find. 
Second, from the new studies added we included only those studies that had been published and 
excluded any working papers. Third, studies where the dependent variable was not economic growth but 
a constructed variable that might include economic growth or the level of economic activity instead were 
excluded. Fourth, studies that seemed to estimate the impact of democracy on growth but failed to report 
the necessary results were excluded as well. Fifth, only those studies that conducted some kind of 
econometric analysis were included. Thus, all of the primary studies included in the meta-analysis were 
chosen on the basis that they offered statistics from which standardized measures of the impact of 
democracy on growth could be calculated. In general the impact of our selection criteria is to exclude 
most of the earlier published literature (mostly published in the 1970s) and also exclude the newer 
unpublished literature. The earlier literature is not included as it is largely not comparable with the 
subsequent empirical and econometric-based literature. The newer literature is excluded because 
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working papers may not contain the final set of estimates and have not yet been through the quality 
filters of the publication process. It should be noted that our dataset, like Doucouliagos and 
Ulubasoglu’s, includes some single-country studies. These were included in order to have a 
comprehensive dataset. Excluding the single-country studies does not change any of our results. 
Two different datasets were derived from the set of 110 comparable studies. The first is the ALL 
SET, which includes the democracy-growth estimates of 1221 regressions regarded as separate studies. 
This is the entire pool of publicly available estimates on the democracy-growth relationship. Second, we 
derived 110 estimates, one from each study, being the best estimate provided by each study (the BEST 
SET). In most cases, authors state their preferred estimate as the benchmark estimate, but for some 
studies we have had to make some judgment. In general, estimates that involve larger groups of 
countries have been included. 
 
4.2 Moderator Variables 
Table 2 lists all the moderator variables used in the MRA, together with informative descriptions. 
It should be noted that all these variables have been chosen as they are all potentially important. That is, 
we have avoided data mining and have considered which factors are likely to be important in influencing 
reported results. An important source of variation in the results is the type and the composition of 
countries used in the primary studies. Accordingly, it is important to identify which countries are 
employed for the analysis in the primary studies. Data preclude the investigation of country-specific 
democracy-growth effects, as most of the studies do not provide enough detail to identify all the 
individual countries. It is possible, however, to identify four broad regional groupings: Africa, Asia, 
Latin America, and Developed countries (mainly the OECD). We use these dummies to derive region-
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specific democracy-growth effects (keeping research design differences constant)78. Also the continuous 
variable NoCountries is included to identify the number of countries included in a study. A similar 
approach to the regional dummies can be adopted to investigate time-period effects. In particular, five 
time (decade) dummy variables are constructed: 1970’s, 1980’s, 1990’s, 2000’s, and 2010’s covering the 
periods of data used in the primary studies. By including these dummies it is then possible to identify 
decade-specific effects in the democracy-growth association and explore whether the association is time 
varying. We also include the continuous variable NoYears to identify the number of years covered by the 
data of the original studies. 
The use of different measures of democracy could also be an important source of variation in 
empirical results (Bollen 1990; Sirowy and Inkeles 1990). Thus, we use the Gastil variable to check 
whether studies that use this index tend to find different results, as compared to those that use other 
indices (which are mainly Polity measures in our dataset). In addition, while some authors have argued 
that democracy is a continuous concept (e.g., Bollen 1990), others such as Przeworski et al. (1996) and 
Przeworski and Limongi (1997) prefer to represent it with a dichotomous indicator. The Dem. Dummy 
variable checks whether dichotomization of the democracy measure impacts on the reported partial 
correlations. The indirect effects of democracy on growth are critically important. Such channels are 
generally addressed in an augmented-neoclassical growth model format by adding the channel variables 
into the right-hand side of the regressions and observing their magnitude and their significance, as well 
as that of the democracy variable (see Dawson 1998 for an exposition). In our context, these indirect 
effects can be explored through the variables Human Capital (HC), Physical Capital (PC), Ecofreedom, 
Inequality, Instability, Govt. Size, Openness, and Inflation.  
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Other differences in specification can be investigated through the variable democracy squared 
(DemoSq), regional dummies (Region)79, and an initial income variable (Convergence). Knowledge 
differences between authors are captured by two variables. The variable Prior represents whether the 
author had published previously in this area. This variable captures individual author-specific knowledge 
effects in modelling the democracy-growth process. Second, the variable Crossauthor captures whether 
the author had received comments/feedback from others publishing in this area80. We have no interest in 
the sign on any of these variables. We merely test whether these knowledge effects impact on reported 
coefficients. 
Publication characteristics are captured by three variables. The Politics variable is included to test 
whether journals of different disciplines tend to publish different results (economics is the base). The 
continuous variable lgoog_pa shows the trust toward the author of the published study by his peers, as 
measured by the logarithm of the number of citations per year from Google Scholar. The continuous 
variable Year shows the year of publication of the primary study, which can help us sort our results by 
year of publication to come to interesting conclusions about the effect size dispersion. 
There are three measures of dynamics. The variable lagdep is included to show if a lag of the 
dependent variable, in our case growth, is used in the analysis of the primary studies. The variable lags is 
included to show if lags of some of the control variables are used in the analysis of the original studies. 
The variable time is included if time dynamics is controlled for by the use of time dummies in the 
primary analyses. 
Primary represents whether a study’s primary focus is the democracy-growth relationship, as 
opposed to the inclusion of democracy merely as a control variable.  
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   Table 2 Covariates used in the MRA of Democracy-Growth Effects 
Moderator Variable Description 
Data Differences 
Cross-section Pooled Data BV81: 1=cross-sectional pooled data used 
Panel Data BV: 1=panel data used 
Single BV: 1=time series for single country used 
NoYears Number of years 
NoCountries Number of countries 
LA BV: 1=Latin American countries included in sample 
Africa BV: 1=African countries included in sample 
Asia BV: 1=Asian countries included in sample 
Developed BV: 1=Developed countries included in sample 
1970’s BV: 1=data from 1970’s used 
1980’s BV: 1=data from 1980’s used 
1990’s BV: 1=data from 1990’s used 
2000’s BV: 1=data from 2000’s used 
2010’s BV: 1=data from 2010’s used 
Gastil BV: 1=used Gastil indicator 
Dem. Dummy BV: 1=used a dummy variable for democracy rather than a democracy index  
Knowledge Effects 
Prior BV: 1=author has published previously in this area 
Crossauthor BV: 1=author states receiving feedback from others that have also published 
in this area before him  
 
Kyriakos J. Xafis 
60 
 
    Table 2 continued Covariates used in the MRA of Democracy-Growth Effects 
Moderator Variable Description 
Specification Differences 
DemoSq BV: 1=non-linear terms of democracy added 
Region BV: 1=regional dummies used 
Ecofreedom BV: 1=economic freedom variable included 
Inequality BV: 1=inequality variable included 
Instability BV: 1=political instability variable included 
Inflation BV: 1=inflation variable included 
Population BV: 1=population variable included 
HC BV: 1=human capital variable included 
PC BV: 1=physical capital variable included 
Openness BV: 1=foreign trade variable included 
Govt. Size BV: 1=government size variable included 
Convergence BV: 1=initial income variable included 
Estimation Differences 
Non-OLS BV: 1=did not use OLS 
OLS BV: 1=did use OLS 
Endogenous BV: 1=democracy is endogenous  
Publication Effects 
Politics BV: 1=if published in a political science journal 
lgoog_pa The logarithm of the number of citations per year from Google Scholar 
Year The year of publication of the study 
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   Table 2 continued Covariates used in the MRA of Democracy-Growth Effects 
Moderator Variable Description 
Measure of Dynamics 
lagdep BV: 1=if lagged dependent variable is used in the regression 
lags BV: 1=if lagged control variables are used in the regression 
time BV: 1=if time dynamics is controlled for 
Other 
Primary BV: 1=if democracy is the primary issue of interest 
 
 
5. Results 
5.1 ALL SET 
In this section we are going to present the results from the analysis of the ALL SET; both the meta-
analysis results and the MRA results. 
 5.1.1. Meta-analysis Results  
Table 3 
 
Model Effect size and 95% 
confidence interval 
Test of null  
[2-Tail] 
Heterogeneity Test 
Model Number 
studies 
Point 
estimate 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Z-
value 
P-
value 
Q-value df(Q) P-
value 
I-
squared 
Fixed 1221 -0.009 -0.011 -0.007 -10.076 0.000 152683.053 1220 0.000 99.201 
Random 1221 -0.014 -0.034 0.006 -1.377 0.168 
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As we can see from the above table the fixed effects model overall summary result of -0.009 has a 
Z-value of -10.076 and a p-value of 0.000; thus, we can safely reject the null hypothesis that the effect 
size, which is the correlation in our case, is 0.0 (or equivalently that there is no effect of democracy on 
growth). Assuming that the 1221 studies are valid we can conclude that democracy probably does affect 
growth even minimally and according to the sign of the point estimate this effect is negative. However, 
according to Cohen’s guidelines an absolute value of less than 0.10 indicates a small effect size and 
since the absolute value of the combined effect size here is 0.01 we can safely say that the magnitude of 
our effect is practically zero and so democracy does not affect growth one way or the other. 
On the other hand, the random effects model overall summary result of -0.014 has a Z-value of  
-1.377 and a p-value of 0.168; thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the effect size, which is the 
correlation in our case, is 0.0 (or equivalently that there is no effect of democracy on growth). Assuming 
that the 1221 studies are valid we can safely conclude that democracy probably does not affect growth 
even by a little. 
Looking at the heterogeneity test the Q statistic, which refers to both the fixed and random effects 
models, has a value of 152683.053 with 1220 degrees of freedom and a p-value of 0.000, which means 
that we must reject the null hypothesis of homogeneity and come to the conclusion that there is 
heterogeneity in the dispersion of the effects among our studies and so the dispersion is not due only to 
differences in the sample size of each study but also to some real differences in the true effect size of 
each study. This also means that we must reject the fixed effects model as a valid statistical model in our 
case and keep the conclusions that are derived from the random effects model. However, due to the 
construction of our ALL SET sample, which includes all 1221 regression estimates of the individual 
effect sizes from all the models used in all the studies, we can accept the fixed effects model as the 
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appropriate model to use here since the majority of the “constructed” studies82 measure the exact same 
relationship between democracy and growth in the exact same way and thus also keep the conclusions 
derived from the fixed effects model. In our case, we are lucky to come basically to the same conclusion 
that there is a zero combined effect of democracy on growth regardless of the statistical model we use. 
Finally, looking at the I2 value which is a proportion referring only to the random effects model we 
conclude that if we were able to remove all the sampling error from our studies the dispersion pattern, 
which is the variance of the dispersion, would be 99% the same, which verifies the conclusion we 
derived from our Q-test that there are indeed real differences of the true effects among our studies. 
We are not able to present the forest plot here due to the enormous size of the number of our 
studies but were you to see the screen of the CMA software where the forest plot was calculated and also 
see it sorted by sample size you would immediately realize that the effect size is minor near zero toward 
the top of the forest plot where the studies with the largest samples cluster and larger as extreme as 
 -0.912 for studies toward the bottom of the forest plot where the studies with the smallest samples 
cluster. This shows us that the effect that democracy has on growth even if it is significant is very small, 
close to zero, for studies with large samples that would avoid sampling error.  
 When we sort our forest plot by earliest year of publication of our studies we immediately realize 
that the effect size is greater toward the top of the forest plot where the earliest publicized studies cluster 
and smaller as minor as 0.008 for studies toward the bottom of the forest plot where the latest publicized 
studies cluster. This shows us that the effect that democracy has on growth even if it is significant is very 
small, close to zero, for the latest studies especially of the last decade, which usually have the largest 
samples, compared to some of the earliest studies back in the 80’s, which seem to have overestimated 
the effect of democracy on growth mainly because they were based on smaller samples. 
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Publication Bias83 
If we check for publication bias by the use of the funnel plot of precision by Fisher’s Z as is shown 
below we are going to realize that there is no publication bias since as is obvious from the graph almost 
all of the studies fall symmetrically about the central axis without any pronounced asymmetry to the 
right or to the left that would otherwise indicate the presence of publication bias. This is probably due to 
the fact that we use the 1221 regression estimates as a pool of independent studies when in fact a lot of 
them are just different models within the same study so they share similar samples and specification 
characteristics. 
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Classic fail-safe N 
 
This meta-analysis incorporates data from 1221 studies, which yield a z-value of 6.07869 and a 
corresponding 2-tailed p-value of 0.00000.   
The fail-safe N is 10524.  This means that we would need to locate and include 10524 'null' studies 
in order for the combined 2-tailed p-value to exceed 0.050.   
Put another way, we would have to have 8.6 missing studies for every observed study for the effect 
to be nullified.  
Thus, we can safely say that there is no discernible publication bias. 
Begg and Mazumdar Rank Correlation Test 
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In this case Kendall's tau b (corrected for ties, if any) is -0.20997, with a 1-tailed p-value 
(recommended) of 0.00000 or a 2-tailed p-value of 0.00000 (based on continuity-corrected normal 
approximation), which means that it is significant and since its value is relatively medium we can safely 
say that there is a noticeable publication bias due to high standard errors of small studies with larger 
effect sizes with high values. 
Egger's Test of the Intercept 
 
In this case the intercept (B0) is 0.68472, 95% confidence interval (-0.16971, 1.53915), with 
t=1.57222, df=1219. The 1-tailed p-value (recommended) is 0.05808, and the 2-tailed p-value is 0.11616 
which means that Egger’s regression intercept in this case is not significant and thus we cannot say if 
there is any publication bias. 
 
Duval and Tweedie's Trim and Fill 
The algorithm is looking for missing studies based on a fixed effect model, and is looking for 
missing studies only to the left side of the mean effect (these parameters are set by the user). Using these 
parameters the method suggests that 129 studies are missing which is a small number compared to the 
observed number of studies as we can see below in the Funnel Plot. 
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 Under the fixed effect model the point estimate and 95% confidence interval for the combined 
studies is -0.00887 (-0.01059, -0.00714).  Using Trim and Fill the imputed point estimate is -0.02152 (-
0.02324, -0.01981).   
Under the random effects model the point estimate and 95% confidence interval for the combined 
studies is -0.01417 (-0.03433, 0.00600).  Using Trim and Fill the imputed point estimate is -0.07161 (-
0.09243, -0.05073).   
Again we can safely conclude based on the above results that there is very little publication bias. 
 
5.1.2. MRA Results 
Model 1 
In Model 1 we include 10 covariates that have to do mainly with the data differences of the primary 
studies, the knowledge effects seeping through the studies and some other covariates such as Politics and 
Primary that have to do with the publication and the main aims of each study. 
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Fixed Effects Model 
 
As we can observe from the above table all the covariates except two, cross-section pooled data 
and panel data, are significant for the effect size. From those that are significant two, single and 
lgoog_pa, have a pronounced negative effect compared to the rest whereas another pair, crossauthor and 
prior, have a pronounced positive effect compared to the rest. 
Below we are going to present two graphs that show us the regression of Fisher’s Z on two of our 
covariates so that we can also see graphically how wide is the dispersion of the effects of individual 
primary studies around the regression line which represents the mean effect of our whole sample of 
primary studies and also get a better sense of the direction of the effect size as a function of covariates. 
The two covariates chosen in this case were Year and lgoog_pa because we wanted to see the direction 
of the effect size as a function of year of publication and as a function of the log citation score that they 
received based on the number of their Google Scholar citations. 
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Regression of Fisher's Z on Year
Year
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In our sample of studies the mean effect size for a study at any given year is indicated by the 
regression line. As we can see from the above scatterplot the majority of the primary studies fall on the 
regression line or close to it which means that most of them have effect sizes close to the mean except 
for four studies that are far away from the mean with extreme Fisher’s Z scores that indicate very high 
correlations close to -1 and +1 respectively. Also most of the big studies that are close to the mean effect 
size are toward the right of the regression line indicating the fact that the majority of studies with large 
samples have been done in recent years. 
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Regression of Fisher's Z on lgoog_pa
lgoog_pa
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In our sample of studies the mean effect size for a study at any given log citation score is indicated 
by the regression line. As we can see from the above scatterplot a great number of the primary studies 
fall on the regression line or close to it which means that a lot of them have effect sizes close to the mean 
except for four studies that are far away from the mean with extreme Fisher’s Z scores that indicate very 
high correlations close to -1 and +1 respectively and they happen to be the same studies that we have 
encountered in the previous scatterplot. Also most of the big studies that are close to the mean effect size 
are toward the left of the regression line indicating the fact that most of our primary studies have low log 
citation scores because they have a relatively small number of citations. 
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Random Effects Model 
 
 
As we can observe from the above table all the covariates except three, politics, prior and 
lgoog_pa, are not significant for the effect size. From the only three that are significant lgoog_pa has a 
small but noticeable negative effect, prior has a small but noticeable positive effect, and politics has 
almost a zero effect. The test of the model tells us that the effect size does differ by subgroup 
membership84 that is for example if a study was conducted using panel data or not is important and so on 
for the rest of the covariates. The Goodness of fit test tells us that the unexplained variance of the true 
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effects is not zero and so the true effect size varies from study to study, even within subgroups. Put 
another way, the model is incomplete – knowing whether a study falls into the Primary or not Primary 
subgroup for example does not allow us to completely predict its effect size and the same goes for the 
rest of the covariates. The I2 statistic is 98.84% which means that nearly all of the observed variance that 
remains (that is, within subgroups) reflects real differences in study effects. 
 
As we can see from the above graph R2=0.30, which means that only 30% of the variance in true 
effects can be explained by the covariates of model 1. This means that there is a 70% of unexplained 
variance by Model 1 and its covariates, which is why we are going to perform the same MRA for another 
model with another set of covariates that might explain these differences in the true effect sizes among 
the different studies. 
Model 2 
In Model 2 we include 10 covariates that have to do mainly with the data differences of the primary 
studies pertaining to the time period of data retrieval and the country composition in the sample of each 
study. 
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Fixed Effects Model 
 
As we can observe from the above table all the covariates are significant for the effect size. From 
all the covariates that are significant two, 1970’s and 2010’s, have a noticeable negative effect compared 
to the rest whereas only one, 2000’s, has a noticeable positive effect compared to the rest. 
Below we are going to present two graphs that show us the regression of Fisher’s Z on two of our 
covariates so that we can also see graphically how wide is the dispersion of the effects of individual 
primary studies around the regression line, which represents the mean effect of our whole sample of 
primary studies and also get a better sense of the direction of the effect size as a function of covariates. 
The two covariates chosen in this case were NoCountries and Developed because we wanted to see the 
direction of the effect size as a function of the number of countries included in the primary studies and as 
a function of the subgroup of studies including developed countries. 
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Regression of Fisher's Z on NoCountries
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In our sample of studies the mean effect size for a study at any given NoCountry is indicated by the 
regression line. As we can see from the above scatterplot the majority of the primary studies fall on the 
regression line or close to it, which means that most of them have effect sizes close to the mean except 
for five studies that are far away from the mean with extreme Fisher’s Z scores that indicate very high 
correlations close to -1 and +1 respectively. Also most of the big studies that are close to the mean effect 
size are toward the right of the middle of the regression line indicating the fact that the majority of 
studies with a large number of countries, 75 and above to be exact, exhibit similar effect sizes compared 
to the rest. 
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Regression of Fisher's Z on Developed
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In our sample of studies the mean effect size for a study that included developed countries is shown 
by the regression line which is a horizontal line to the right of the scatterplot and above 1 from the x-
axis. As we can see from the above scatterplot the majority of the primary studies including developed 
countries fall on the regression line or close to it which means that a lot of them have effect sizes close 
to the mean except for five studies that are far away from the mean with extreme Fisher’s Z scores that 
indicate very high correlations close to -1 and +1 respectively and they happen to be for the most part the 
same studies that we have encountered in the previous scatterplot.  
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Random Effects Model 
 
As we can observe from the above table five out of the ten covariates are significant for the effect 
size. From all the covariates that are significant one, 2010’s, has a noticeable negative effect compared 
to the rest and another one, Africa, has a pronounced positive effect compared to the rest. The test of the 
model tells us that the effect size does differ by subgroup membership that is for example if a study 
included countries from Africa or not is important and so on for the rest of the covariates. The Goodness 
of fit test tells us that the unexplained variance of the true effects is not zero and so the true effect size 
varies from study to study, even within subgroups. Put another way, the model is incomplete – knowing 
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whether a study includes data from the 2010’s or not for example does not allow us to completely predict 
its effect size and the same goes for the rest of the covariates. The I2 statistic is 99.15% which means that 
nearly all of the observed variance that remains (that is, within subgroups) reflects real differences in 
study effects. 
 
As we can see from the above graph R2=0.05, which means that only 5% of the variance in true 
effects can be explained by the covariates of model 2. This means that there is a 95% of unexplained 
variance by Model 2 and its covariates, which is why we are going to perform the same MRA for another 
model with another set of covariates that might explain these differences in the true effect sizes among 
the different studies. 
 
 
Model 3 
In Model 3 we include 10 covariates that have to do mainly with the data differences and the 
specification differences of the primary studies pertaining to measure of democracy and also a number of 
covariates dealing with socioeconomic measures. 
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Fixed Effects Model 
 
As we can observe from the above table all the covariates are significant for the effect size. From 
all the covariates that are significant one, Gastil, has a strong negative effect compared to the rest and 
another one, DemoSq, has an almost strong positive effect compared to the rest. 
Below we are going to present two graphs that show us the regression of Fisher’s Z on two of our 
covariates as we have done previously. The two covariates chosen in this case were Gastil and 
Ecofreedom because we wanted to see the direction of the effect size as a function of the subgroup of 
studies including the Gastil Index as a democracy measure and as a function of the subgroup of studies 
including an economic freedom measure. 
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Regression of Fisher's Z on Gastil
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In our sample of studies the mean effect size for a study that included the Gastil index as a 
democracy measure is shown by the regression line which is a horizontal line to the right of the 
scatterplot and above 1 from the x-axis. As we can see from the above scatterplot a large number of the 
primary studies including the Gastil index fall either very close to the regression line or close to its 
neighborhood which means that a few of them have effect sizes close to the mean and the rest deviate 
from the mean from a little to a lot like the five studies that are far away from the mean with extreme 
Fisher’s Z scores that indicate very high correlations close to -1 and +1 respectively and they happen to 
be for the most part the same studies that we have encountered in previous scatterplots. 
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Regression of Fisher's Z on Ecofreedom
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In our sample of studies the mean effect size for a study that included a measure of economic 
freedom is shown by the regression line which is a horizontal line to the right of the scatterplot and 
above 1 from the x-axis. As we can see from the above scatterplot almost all of the small primary studies 
including some kind of an economic freedom measure with no exception fall directly on the regression 
line or they are intersecting it which means that almost all of them have effect sizes very close to the 
mean if not exactly equal to it and their dispersion about the mean is minimal.  
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Random Effects Model 
 
As we can observe from the above table four out of the ten covariates are significant for the effect 
size. From all the covariates that are significant one, Inequality, has a strong negative effect compared to 
the rest and another one, DemoSq, has an almost strong positive effect compared to the rest. The test of 
the model tells us that the effect size does differ by subgroup membership that is for example if a study 
included a measure of inequality or not is important and so on for the rest of the covariates. The 
Goodness of fit test tells us that the unexplained variance of the true effects is not zero and so the true 
effect size varies from study to study, even within subgroups. Put another way, the model is incomplete 
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– knowing whether a study includes a measure of economic freedom or not for example does not allow 
us to completely predict its effect size and the same goes for the rest of the covariates. The I2 statistic is 
99.03%, which means that nearly all of the observed variance that remains (that is, within subgroups) 
reflects real differences in study effects. 
 
As we can see from the above graph R2=0.16, which means that only 16% of the variance in true 
effects can be explained by the covariates of model 3. This means that there is an 84% of unexplained 
variance by Model 3 and its covariates, which is why we are going to perform the same MRA for another 
model with another set of covariates that might explain these differences in the true effect sizes among 
the different studies. 
 
 
Model 4 
In Model 4 we include 10 covariates that have to do mainly with the estimation differences and the 
specification differences of the primary studies pertaining to the use or not of OLS as an estimation 
method and also to a number of covariates dealing with socioeconomic measures. 
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Fixed Effects Model 
 
 
As we can observe from the above table all the covariates are significant for the effect size. From 
all the covariates that are significant one, Openness, has a strong negative effect compared to the rest and 
another one, Govt. Size, has a medium positive effect compared to the rest. 
Below we are going to present two graphs that show us the regression of Fisher’s Z on two of our 
covariates as we have done and explained before. The two covariates chosen in this case were 
Convergence and lagdep because we wanted to see the direction of the effect size as a function of the 
subgroup of studies including a measure of the initial income of the country at the period of interest and 
as a function of the subgroup of studies including a lag of the dependent variable that is a lag of growth. 
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Regression of Fisher's Z on Convergence
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In our sample of studies the mean effect size for a study that included a measure of the initial 
income of each country included in the study is shown by the regression line which is a horizontal line to 
the right of the scatterplot and above 1 from the x-axis. As we can see from the above scatterplot almost 
all of the big primary studies including a measure of the initial income with very few exceptions of small 
studies fall directly on the regression line or they are intersecting it which means that almost all of them 
have effect sizes very close to the mean if not exactly equal to it with a minimal dispersion about the 
mean. 
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Regression of Fisher's Z on lagdep
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In our sample of studies the mean effect size for a study that included a lag of growth is shown by 
the regression line which is a horizontal line to the right of the scatterplot and above 1 from the x-axis. 
As we can see from the above scatterplot almost all of the primary studies including a lag of growth with 
no exception at all fall directly on the regression line or they are intersecting it which means that all of 
them have effect sizes very close to the mean if not exactly equal to it. 
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Random Effects Model 
 
As we can observe from the above table five out of the ten covariates are significant for the effect 
size and one is marginally significant whereas the remaining four are not significant. From all the 
covariates that are significant one, Inflation, has a pronounced negative effect compared to the rest and 
another one, Endogenous, has a noticeable negative effect compared to the rest. The test of the model 
tells us that the effect size does differ by subgroup membership that is for example if a study included a 
measure of inflation or not is important and so on for the rest of the covariates. The Goodness of fit test 
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tells us that the unexplained variance of the true effects is not zero and so the true effect size varies from 
study to study, even within subgroups. Put another way, the model is incomplete – knowing whether a 
study was estimated with OLS or not for example does not allow us to completely predict its effect size 
and the same goes for the rest of the covariates. The I2 statistic is 98.96%, which means that nearly all of 
the observed variance that remains (that is, within subgroups) reflects real differences in study effects. 
 
As we can see from the above graph R2=0.21, which means that only 21% of the variance in true 
effects can be explained by the covariates of model 4. This means that there is a 79% of unexplained 
variance by Model 4 and its covariates. 
In summary, based on the R2 values of our four RE models we can safely say that Model 1is the 
best at explaining the variance in true effects through its set of covariates since it explains 30% of the 
variance and a close second is Model 4 which explains through its covariates 21% of the variance. 
However, still a lot of the variance remains unexplained which means that there could be other 
covariates that haven’t been tested yet that would explain it. Also, the model statistics for the four FE 
models indicate that all four models explain at least some of the variance in effect size but at the same 
time the data in all four models are not consistent with the assumptions of the fixed effect model. 
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5.2 BEST SET 
In this section we are going to present the results from the analysis of the BEST SET both the meta-
analysis results and the MRA results. 
 5.2.1. Meta-analysis Results 
Table 4 
 
As we can see from the above table the fixed effects model overall summary result of -0.506 has a 
Z-value of -172.738 and a p-value of 0.000; thus, we can safely reject the null hypothesis that the effect 
size, which is the correlation in our case, is 0.0 (or equivalently that there is no effect of democracy on 
growth). Assuming that the 110 studies are valid we can conclude that democracy probably does affect 
growth quite a lot and according to the sign of the point estimate this effect is negative. Moreover, 
according to Cohen’s guidelines an absolute value of more than 0.40 indicates a strong effect size and 
since the absolute value of the combined effect size here is 0.51 we can safely say that the magnitude of 
our effect is quite strong and so democracy does affect growth in a prominent negative manner. 
On the other hand, the random effects model overall summary result of 0.009 has a Z-value of -
0.099 and a p-value of 0.921; thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the effect size, which is the 
correlation in our case, is 0.0 (or equivalently that there is no effect of democracy on growth). Assuming 
Model Effect size and 95% 
confidence interval 
Test of null  
[2-Tail] 
Heterogeneity Test 
Model Number 
studies 
Point 
estimate 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Z-value P-
value 
Q-value df(Q) P-
value 
I-
squared 
Fixed 110 -0.506 -0.511 -0.501 -172.738 0.000 69184.163 109 0.000 99.842 
Random 110  0.009 -0.161 0.178  0.099 0.921 
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that the 110 studies are valid we can safely conclude that democracy probably does not affect growth 
even by a little. 
Looking at the heterogeneity test the Q statistic, which refers to both the fixed and random effects 
models, has a value of 69184.163 with 109 degrees of freedom and a p-value of 0.000, which means that 
we must reject the null hypothesis of homogeneity and come to the conclusion that there is heterogeneity 
in the dispersion of the effects among our 110 studies and so the dispersion is not due only to differences 
in the sample size of each study but also to some real differences in the true effect size of each study. 
This also means that we must reject the fixed effects model as a valid statistical model in our case and 
keep the conclusions that are derived from the random effects model. Moreover, due to the construction 
of our BEST SET sample, which includes the best 110 regression estimates out of all the individual 
effect sizes from all the models used in all the studies, we can safely reject the fixed effects model as the 
appropriate model to use here since the majority of the 110 studies included come from different authors 
having used a variety of methodologies and different samples and do not always measure the exact same 
relationship between democracy and growth in the exact same way and thus also reject the conclusions 
derived from the fixed effects model. In our case, we come to the conclusion that there is a zero 
combined effect of democracy on growth based on the RE statistical model, which is the appropriate one 
to use here. 
Finally, looking at the I2 value, which is a proportion referring only to the random effects model we 
conclude that if we were able to remove all the sampling error from our studies the dispersion pattern, 
which is the variance of the dispersion, would be almost 100% the same, which verifies the conclusion 
we derived from our Q-test that there are indeed real differences of the true effects among our studies. 
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We are not able to present the forest plot here due to the big number of studies included in our 
sample but were you to see the screen of the CMA software where the forest plot was calculated and also 
see it sorted by sample size you would immediately realize that the effect size is minor near zero toward 
the top of the forest plot where the studies with the largest samples cluster and larger as extreme as 
 0.757 for studies toward the bottom of the forest plot where the studies with the smallest samples 
cluster. This shows us that the effect that democracy has on growth even if it is significant is very small, 
close to zero, for studies with large samples that would avoid sampling error.  
 When we sort our forest plot by earliest year of publication of our studies we immediately realize 
that the effect size is greater toward the top of the forest plot where the earliest publicized studies cluster 
and smaller as minor as 0.009 for studies toward the bottom of the forest plot where the latest publicized 
studies cluster. This shows us that the effect that democracy has on growth even if it is significant is very 
small, close to zero, for the latest studies especially of the last decade, which usually have the largest 
samples compared to some of the earliest studies back in the 80’s, which seem to have overestimated the 
effect of democracy on growth mainly because they were based on smaller samples. 
 
Publication Bias 
If we check for publication bias by the use of the funnel plot of precision by Fisher’s Z as is shown 
below we are going to realize that there is a remarkable publication bias since as is obvious from the 
graph almost all of the studies fall asymmetrically to the right of the central axis which is centered at the 
mean effect size around -0.5. 
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This is probably due to the fact that we now have one model per study, the benchmark model, and 
so now the majority of the studies are quite different and do not share as many common characteristics 
as before in the ALL SET analysis where all of the models of all the studies were included in the analysis 
thus making the set more homogeneous in certain characteristics.  
 
Classic fail-safe N 
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This meta-analysis incorporates data from 110 studies, which yield a z-value of -26.23337 and a 
corresponding 2-tailed p-value of 0.00000.   
The fail-safe N is 19597.  This means that we would need to locate and include 19597 'null' studies 
in order for the combined 2-tailed p-value to exceed 0.050.   
Put another way, we would have to have 178.2 missing studies for every observed study for the 
effect to be nullified.  
Thus, we can safely say that there is no discernible publication bias at all. 
 
Begg and Mazumdar Rank Correlation Test 
 
In this case Kendall's tau b (corrected for ties, if any) is -0.57550, with a 1-tailed p-value 
(recommended) of 0.00000 or a 2-tailed p-value of 0.00000 (based on continuity-corrected normal 
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approximation) which means that it is significant and since its value is large we can safely say that there 
is strong publication bias. 
Egger's Test of the Intercept 
 
In this case the intercept (B0) is 12.66821, 95% confidence interval (7.05241, 18.28402), with 
t=4.47141, df=108. The 1-tailed p-value (recommended) is 0.00001, and the 2-tailed p-value is 0.00002 
which means that Egger’s regression intercept in this case is significant and thus we can say that there is 
a remarkable publication bias since the value of the intercept is quite large. 
 
Duval and Tweedie's Trim and Fill 
The algorithm is looking for missing studies based on a fixed effect model, and is looking for 
missing studies only to the left side of the mean effect (these parameters are set by the user). Using these 
parameters the method suggests that 52 studies are missing. This is quite a big number compared to the 
observed number of studies as we can see below in the Funnel Plot. In fact, it is about half the number of 
the observed studies. 
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Under the fixed effect model the point estimate and 95% confidence interval for the combined 
studies is -0.50582 (-0.51051, -0.50110).  Using Trim and Fill the imputed point estimate is -0.64717 (-
0.65044, -0.64387).    
Under the random effects model the point estimate and 95% confidence interval for the combined 
studies is 0.00869 (-0.16120, 0.17809).  Using Trim and Fill the imputed point estimate is -0.51295 (-
0.60980, -0.40101).   
Again we can safely conclude based on the above results that there is a very big publication bias. 
 
5.2.2. MRA Results 
Model 1 
In Model 1 we include 10 covariates that have to do mainly with the data differences of the primary 
studies, the knowledge effects seeping through the studies and some other covariates such as Politics and 
Primary that have to do with the publication and the main aims of each study. 
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Fixed Effects Model 
 
As we can observe from the above table all the covariates except two, cross-section pooled data 
and panel data, are significant for the effect size. From those that are significant two, single and 
lgoog_pa, have a strong to very strong negative effect compared to the rest whereas another pair, 
crossauthor and prior, have a very strong positive effect compared to the rest. 
 
Below we are going to present two graphs that show us the regression of Fisher’s Z on two of our 
covariates so that we can also see graphically how wide is the dispersion of the effects of individual 
primary studies around the regression line, which represents the mean effect of our whole sample of 
primary studies and also get a better sense of the direction of the effect size as a function of covariates. 
The two covariates chosen in this case were Year and lgoog_pa because we wanted to see the direction 
of the effect size as a function of year of publication and as a function of the log citation score that they 
received based on the number of their Google Scholar citations. 
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Regression of Fisher's Z on Year
Year
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76 MODEL 1 T1 is the study that is more prominently away from the regression line and
 making the mean effect size gravitate toward -0.50 away from 0.01 which is the mean effect size of most of the remaining studies
 
In our sample of studies the mean effect size for a study at any given year is indicated by the 
regression line. As we can see from the above scatterplot almost all of the primary studies fall away from 
the regression line either mainly above it or below it which means that most of them have effect sizes 
away from the mean. In fact, one very big study seems to be the culprit for making the mean effect move 
away from -0.10 to -0.50 as is obvious from the graph. Also most of the big studies that are clustering 
above the regression line are toward the right of the regression line indicating the fact that the majority 
of studies with large samples have been done in recent years. 
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Regression of Fisher's Z on lgoog_pa
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In our sample of studies the mean effect size for a study at any given log citation score is indicated 
by the regression line. As we can see from the above scatterplot the majority of the primary studies fall 
away from the regression line which has a very steep negative slope indicating that the mean effect size 
is changing inversely proportional to the log citation score. In fact, one very big study seems to be the 
culprit for making the mean effect size, which is represented by the regression line behave in such a 
peculiar manner as is obvious from the graph. This study is the same one that we have encountered 
before and it has one of the biggest log citation scores, which means that it has a great number of 
citations in Google Scholar. 
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Random Effects Model 
 
 
As we can observe from the above table all of the covariates without exceptions are not significant 
for the effect size. The test of the model tells us that the effect size does not differ by subgroup 
membership that is for example if a study was conducted using panel data or not is not important for the 
effect size and so on for the rest of the covariates. The Goodness of fit test tells us that the unexplained 
variance of the true effects is not zero and so the true effect size varies from study to study, even within 
subgroups. Put another way, the model is incomplete – knowing whether a study falls into the Primary or 
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not Primary subgroup for example does not allow us to completely predict its effect size and the same 
goes for the rest of the covariates. The I2 statistic is 99.07%, which means that nearly all of the observed 
variance that remains (that is, within subgroups) reflects real differences in study effects. 
 
 
As we can see from the above graph R2=0.69 which means that 69% of the variance in true effects 
can be explained by the covariates of model 1. This means that there is only a 31% of unexplained 
variance by Model 1 and its covariates which is exactly the opposite relationship from the one we 
encountered when we analyzed Model 1 with the ALL SET studies. 
 
 
Model 2 
In Model 2 we include 10 covariates that have to do mainly with the data differences of the primary 
studies pertaining to the time period of data retrieval and the country composition in the sample of each 
study. 
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Fixed Effects Model 
 
As we can observe from the above table all of the covariates are significant for the effect size. 
From all the covariates that are significant two, Developed and 1990’s, have an extremely strong 
negative effect compared to the rest whereas only one, 2000’s, has also an extremely strong positive 
effect compared to the rest. 
Below we are going to present two graphs that show us the regression of Fisher’s Z on two of our 
covariates so that we can also see graphically how wide is the dispersion of the effects of individual 
primary studies around the regression line, which represents the mean effect of our whole sample of 
primary studies and also get a better sense of the direction of the effect size as a function of covariates. 
The two covariates chosen in this case were NoCountries and Developed because we wanted to see the 
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direction of the effect size as a function of the number of countries included in the primary studies and as 
a function of the subgroup of studies including developed countries. 
Regression of Fisher's Z on NoCountries
NoCountries
-50.0 -25.0 0.0 25.0 50.0 75.0 100.0 125.0 150.0 175.0 200.0 225.0 250.0
Fi
sh
er
's
 
Z
2.00
1.50
1.00
0.50
0.00
-0.50
-1.00
-1.50
-2.00
-2.50
-3.00
 
In our sample of studies the mean effect size for a study at any given NoCountry is indicated by the 
regression line. As we can see from the above scatterplot the majority of the primary studies fall away 
from the regression line which has a slightly positive slope indicating that the mean effect size is 
changing somewhat proportional to the number of countries included in a study. In fact, one very big 
study seems to be the culprit for making the mean effect size, which is represented by the regression line 
behave in such a manner as is obvious from the graph. This study is the same one that we have 
encountered before and it includes a large number of countries compared to the other ones.  
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Regression of Fisher's Z on Developed
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In our sample of studies the mean effect size for a study that included developed countries is shown 
by the regression line which is a horizontal line to the right of the scatterplot and above 1 from the x-
axis. As we can see from the above scatterplot almost all of the primary studies including developed 
countries fall above the regression line and close to the 0.0 effect size whereas one big study the same 
one we have been encountering in the last few scatterplots falls far below the regression line and is the 
main reason for the mean effect size to be -0.50. If it wasn’t for this study the regression line would pass 
through the 0.0 effect size point estimate.  
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Random Effects Model 
 
As we can observe from the above table all of the covariates without exceptions are not significant 
for the effect size. The test of the model tells us that the effect size does not differ by subgroup 
membership that is for example if a study included countries from Africa or not is not important for the 
effect size and so on for the rest of the covariates. The Goodness of fit test tells us that the unexplained 
variance of the true effects is not zero and so the true effect size varies from study to study, even within 
subgroups. Put another way, the model is incomplete – knowing whether a study includes data from the 
2010’s or not for example does not allow us to completely predict its effect size and the same goes for 
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the rest of the covariates. The I2 statistic is 99.74%, which means that nearly all of the observed variance 
that remains (that is, within subgroups) reflects real differences in study effects. 
 
 
As we can see from the above graph R2=0.21 which means that only 21% of the variance in true 
effects can be explained by the covariates of model 2. This means that there is a 79% of unexplained 
variance by Model 2 and its covariates, which is why we are going to perform the same MRA for another 
model with another set of covariates that might explain these differences in the true effect sizes among 
the different studies. 
 
 
Model 3 
In Model 3 we include 10 covariates that have to do mainly with the data differences and the 
specification differences of the primary studies pertaining to measure of democracy and also a number of 
covariates dealing with socioeconomic measures. 
Kyriakos J. Xafis 
105 
 
Fixed Effects Model 
 
 
As we can observe from the above table all of the covariates are significant for the effect size 
except one-Instability. From all the covariates that are significant one, Gastil, has an extremely strong 
negative effect compared to the rest and another one, DemoSq, has also an extremely strong positive 
effect compared to the rest. 
Below we are going to present two graphs that show us the regression of Fisher’s Z on two of our 
covariates as we have done previously. The two covariates chosen in this case were Gastil and 
Ecofreedom because we wanted to see the direction of the effect size as a function of the subgroup of 
studies including the Gastil Index as a democracy measure and as a function of the subgroup of studies 
including an economic freedom measure. 
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In our sample of studies the mean effect size for a study that included the Gastil index as a 
democracy measure is shown by the regression line, which is a horizontal line to the right of the 
scatterplot and above 1 from the x-axis. As we can see from the above scatterplot our graph looks 
exactly like the one with the regression of Fisher’s Z on Developed countries for similar reasons. 
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Regression of Fisher's Z on Ecofreedom
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In our sample of studies the mean effect size for a study that included a measure of economic 
freedom is shown by the regression line, which is a horizontal line to the right of the scatterplot and 
above 1 from the x-axis. As we can see from the above scatterplot almost all of the primary studies 
including some kind of an economic freedom measure with no exception fall directly above the 
regression line except one that falls below, which means that almost all of them have effect sizes quite 
away from the mean effect size.  
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Random Effects Model 
 
As we can observe from the above table only one, Inequality, out of the ten covariates is significant 
for the effect size. Inequality the only covariate significant for the effect size has the strongest negative 
effect compared to the rest. The test of the model tells us that the effect size does not differ by subgroup 
membership that is for example if a study included a measure of inequality or not is not important and so 
on for the rest of the covariates. The Goodness of fit test tells us that the unexplained variance of the true 
effects is not zero and so the true effect size varies from study to study, even within subgroups. Put 
another way, the model is incomplete – knowing whether a study includes a measure of economic 
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freedom or not for example does not allow us to completely predict its effect size and the same goes for 
the rest of the covariates. The I2 statistic is 99.37%, which means that nearly all of the observed variance 
that remains (that is, within subgroups) reflects real differences in study effects. 
 
 
 
As we can see from the above graph R2=0.62 which means that 62% of the variance in true effects 
can be explained by the covariates of model 3. This means that there is only a 38% of unexplained 
variance by Model 3 and its covariates.  
 
 
Model 4 
In Model 4 we include 10 covariates that have to do mainly with the estimation differences and the 
specification differences of the primary studies pertaining to the use or not of OLS as an estimation 
method and also to a number of covariates dealing with socioeconomic measures. 
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Fixed Effects Model 
 
 
As we can observe from the above table all of the covariates except two, Non-OLS and time, are 
significant for the effect size. From all the covariates that are significant one, Openness, has an 
extremely strong negative effect compared to the rest and another one, Govt. Size, has a quite strong 
positive effect compared to the rest. 
Below we are going to present two graphs that show us the regression of Fisher’s Z on two of our 
covariates as we have done and explained before. The two covariates chosen in this case were 
Convergence and lagdep because we wanted to see the direction of the effect size as a function of the 
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subgroup of studies including a measure of the initial income of the country at the period of interest and 
as a function of the subgroup of studies including a lag of the dependent variable that is a lag of growth. 
 
Regression of Fisher's Z on Convergence
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In our sample of studies the mean effect size for a study that included a measure of the initial 
income of each country included in the study is shown by the regression line, which is a horizontal line 
to the right of the scatterplot and above 1 from the x-axis. As we can see from the above scatterplot 
almost all of the primary studies including a measure of the initial income lie above the regression line 
with only a couple of small studies falling below the regression line, which means that all of them have 
effect sizes far away from the mean effect size. 
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Regression of Fisher's Z on lagdep
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In our sample of studies the mean effect size for a study that included a lag of growth is shown by 
the regression line, which is a horizontal line to the right of the scatterplot and above 1 from the x-axis. 
As we can see from the above scatterplot all of the primary studies including a lag of growth with no 
exception at all fall well above the regression line which means that all of them have effect sizes very far 
away from the mean effect size. 
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Random Effects Model 
 
As we can observe from the above table none of the ten covariates are significant for the effect 
size. The test of the model tells us that the effect size does not differ by subgroup membership that is for 
example if a study included a measure of inflation or not is not important and so on for the rest of the 
covariates. The Goodness of fit test tells us that the unexplained variance of the true effects is not zero 
and so the true effect size varies from study to study, even within subgroups. Put another way, the model 
is incomplete – knowing whether a study was estimated with OLS or not for example does not allow us 
to completely predict its effect size and the same goes for the rest of the covariates. The I2 statistic is 
98.96%, which means that nearly all of the observed variance that remains (that is, within subgroups) 
reflects real differences in study effects. 
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As we can see from the above graph R2=0.73 which means that 73% of the variance in true effects 
can be explained by the covariates of model 4. This means that there is only a 27% of unexplained 
variance by Model 4 and its covariates. 
In summary, based on the R2 values of our four models we can safely say that Model 4 is the best 
at explaining the variance in true effects through its set of covariates since it explains 73% of the 
variance and a close second is Model 1 which explains through its covariates 69% of the variance. All 4 
models explain the variance in true effects far better than they do for the ALL SET sample of studies. 
However, the results are not significant as they were for the ALL SET sample of studies. Also, the model 
statistics for the four FE models indicate that all four models explain at least some of the variance in 
effect size but at the same time the data in all four models are not consistent with the assumptions of the 
fixed effect model. 
5.3 Summary of Results 
In this section we are going to present a summary of our results as they were derived from the 
previously presented tables and graphs. 
Kyriakos J. Xafis 
115 
 
Direct Effect 
Here we are going to explain why there is no direct effect between democracy and growth or the 
effect is zero. Summarizing the meta-analysis results of our two sets the ALL SET and the BEST SET 
we get the following table: 
Table 5 
 ALL SET 
Point Estimate  
BEST SET 
Point Estimate 
Fixed Effects -0.009 
(-10.076) 
-0.506 
(-172.738) 
Random Effects -0.014 
(-1.377) 
0.009 
(0.099) 
 
Heterogeneity Test 
Q-value 
152683.053 69184.163 
  Z-values are reported in parentheses 
As is obvious from the above table the heterogeneity test indicates the existence of heterogeneity in 
both data sets thus making the use of the Fixed Effects model statistically unsound. The Z-values of the 
Random Effects model for both data sets are very small making the combined effect size point estimate 
in both cases not statistically significant. In other words, the effect size is nullified or we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis which states that the combined effect size is 0.0. 
Indirect Effects 
Here we are going to analyze the partial existence of indirect effects between democracy and 
growth. Summarizing the meta-analysis results of our two sets the ALL SET and the BEST SET we get 
the following table: 
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Table 6 
Moderator Variables ALL SET 
Point estimate FE 
BEST SET 
Point estimate FE 
ALL SET 
Point estimate RE 
BEST SET 
Point estimate RE 
Cross-section Pooled Data 0.0387 
(0.54) 
-0.1017 
(-0.98) 
-0.0346 
(-0.16) 
-0.0348 
(-0.06) 
Panel Data 0.0774 
(1.08) 
0.0641 
(0.63) 
-0.0246 
(-0.11) 
-0.0100 
(-0.02) 
NoYears 0.0012 
(43.88) 
0.0030 
(17.45) 
0.0003 
(1.39) 
0.0000 
(0.01) 
Single -0.2917 
(-3.84) 
-0.3951 
(-3.01) 
-0.3501 
(-1.57) 
-0.2960 
(-0.49) 
Politics 0.0633 
(25.18) 
0.0956 
(8.26) 
0.0438 
(2.29) 
-0.0007 
(-0.01) 
Primary -0.1365 
(-42.13) 
-0.2449 
(-21.13) 
-0.0211 
(-1.02) 
-0.0129 
(-0.12) 
Crossauthor 0.3616 
(116.47) 
0.6739 
(62.75) 
0.0100 
(0.39) 
0.0605 
(0.51) 
Prior 0.3599 
(108.80) 
0.6812 
(69.05) 
0.1263 
(4.61) 
0.0831 
(0.64) 
lgoog_pa -0.3365 
(-138.26) 
-0.6021 
(-95.98) 
-0.1044 
(-6.54) 
-0.1281 
(-1.65) 
Year -0.0103 
(-32.49) 
-0.0121 
(-12.70) 
-0.0010 
(-0.60) 
-0.0028 
(-0.34) 
Z-values are reported in parentheses 
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Table 6 continued 
Moderator Variables ALL SET 
Point estimate FE 
BEST SET 
Point estimate FE 
ALL SET 
Point estimate RE 
BEST SET 
Point estimate RE 
LA 0.0231 
(3.00) 
0.2509 
(7.16) 
-0.0525 
(-0.96) 
0.0177 
(0.04) 
Africa -0.0252 
(-4.21) 
-0.1522 
(-4.62) 
0.2950 
(6.76) 
0.0109 
(0.03) 
Asia -0.0265 
(-3.91) 
0.4773 
(15.09) 
-0.1768 
(-3.70) 
0.0775 
(0.22) 
Developed -0.0359 
(-9.44) 
-1.0659 
(-51.61) 
-0. 0261 
(-0.69) 
-0.0869 
(-0.30) 
1970’s -0.2050 
(-53.53) 
-0.2876 
(-21.19) 
-0.1320 
(-3.83) 
-0.0911 
(-0.34) 
1980’s 0.0445 
(5.60) 
-0.3281 
(-14.23) 
-0.0226 
(-0.56) 
0.0643 
(0.25) 
1990’s -0.1051 
(-18.75) 
-1.0512 
(-73.14) 
0.0908 
(3.32) 
-0.2086 
(-1.12) 
2000’s 0.1549 
(74.77) 
0.9970 
(118.07) 
0.0082 
(0.29) 
0. 1132 
(0.47) 
2010’s -0.1661 
(-17.47) 
-0.3568 
(-11.49) 
-0.1895 
(-2.95) 
-0.0789 
(-0.17) 
NoCountries 0.0006 
(27.62) 
0.0023 
(17.99) 
0.0004 
(1.31) 
0.0005 
(0.23) 
Z-values are reported in parentheses 
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Table 6 continued 
Moderator Variables ALL SET 
Point estimate FE 
BEST SET 
Point estimate FE 
ALL SET 
Point estimate RE 
BEST SET 
Point estimate RE 
Gastil -0.3795 
(-123.13) 
-1. 0909 
(-138.41) 
0.0044 
(0.20) 
-0.0192 
(-0.16) 
Dem. Dummy 0.0455 
(18.05) 
-0.2686 
(-26.41) 
0.0119 
(0.39) 
0.0030 
(0.02) 
DemoSq 0.3380 
(45.56) 
1.0836 
(29.08) 
0.3100 
(7.53) 
0.4798 
(1.89) 
Region -0.1389 
(-73.57) 
-0.6821 
(-76.71) 
-0. 0020 
(-0.09) 
-0.0920 
(-0.65) 
Ecofreedom 0.0539 
(4.98) 
0.1821 
(6.07) 
0.1214 
(2.48) 
0.1018 
(0.43) 
Inequality -0.1918 
(-11.50) 
-0.1964 
(-2.03) 
-0.5591 
(-11.13) 
-1.0791 
(-2.43) 
Instability -0.1183 
(-13.33) 
-0.0332 
(-0.54) 
-0.2189 
(-5.30) 
0.0797 
(0.23) 
Population 0.0917 
(41.43) 
0.1310 
(10.95) 
0.0108 
(0.52) 
0. 0268 
(0.22) 
HC -0.0080 
(-2.34) 
0.4277 
(33.24) 
0.0376 
(1.62) 
0.0149 
(0.12) 
PC 0.0513 
(16.73) 
-0.2165 
(-18.16) 
-0.0224 
(-0.94) 
-0.0799 
(-0.64) 
Z-values are reported in parentheses 
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Table 6 continued 
Moderator Variables ALL SET 
Point estimate FE 
BEST SET 
Point estimate FE 
ALL SET 
Point estimate RE 
BEST SET 
Point estimate RE 
Non-OLS -0.2680 
(-4.28) 
-0.0990 
(-1.10) 
-0.0286 
(-0.16) 
-0.0501 
(-0.12) 
OLS -0. 2674 
(-4.28) 
-0.4273 
(-4.81) 
-0.0551 
(-0.32) 
-0.1938 
(-0.52) 
Endogenous 0.0432 
(12.42) 
0.0806 
(6.32) 
-0.1070 
(-2.43) 
-0.1159 
(-0.58) 
Inflation 0.1713 
(41.36) 
0.6466 
(35.01) 
-0. 2035 
(-7.00) 
0.0183 
(0.13) 
Convergence 0. 0091 
(2.56) 
0.2332 
(18.63) 
-0.0250 
(-0.85) 
0. 1315 
(1.08) 
Openness -0.4707 
(-141.02) 
-1.2550 
(-130.75) 
0.0516 
(1.97) 
0.0531 
(0.39) 
Govt. Size 0.2406 
(69.80) 
0.7567 
(55.03) 
-0.0990 
(-3.97) 
-0.2044 
(-1.58) 
lagdep -0.0246 
(-9.04) 
-0.9010 
(-42.38) 
0.0984 
(2.98) 
0. 0142 
(0.07) 
lags 0.2220 
(62.47) 
0.2109 
(17.19) 
0.0138 
(0.54) 
0.0797 
(0.63) 
time 0.0069 
(2.85) 
0.0171 
(1.54) 
0.0600 
(2.58) 
0.0062 
(0.04) 
Z-values are reported in parentheses 
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From the above summary table of indirect effects we can come to the conclusion that relatively 
robust covariates that seem to play a role in the effect that democracy has on growth even by a little are 
the following: Politics, Prior, lgoog_pa, Africa, Asia, 1970’s, 1990’s, 2010’s, DemoSq, Ecofreedom, 
Inequality, Endogenous, Inflation, Openness, Govt. Size, lagdep. From all these covariates Inequality 
seems to be the most robust since it is significant in all the regressions with all the samples. This means 
that in all of the studies that tested for inequality or used inequality as a control variable the effect size of 
democracy on growth was always affected through this channel and always with a negative sign. The 
magnitude of this indirect effect is medium according to the FE models and very strong according to the 
RE models. The rest of the covariates mentioned above are significant in three out of four regressions 
making them also important in affecting the effect size of democracy on growth but not as important as 
Inequality. The covariates Prior, DemoSq, and Ecofreedom play a consistent positive role in the 
relationship of democracy to growth since their signs are always positive. The magnitude of the indirect 
effect through the Prior and DemoSq channels is strong to very strong whereas the magnitude of the 
indirect effect through the Ecofreedom channel is weak to medium. The covariates lgoog_pa, 1970’s, 
and 2010’s play a consistent negative role in the relationship of democracy to growth since their signs 
are always negative. The magnitude of the indirect effect through the 1970’s and 2010’s channels is 
medium to medium strong whereas the magnitude of the indirect effect through the lgoog_pa channel is 
medium to strong. Finally, the majority of the remaining covariates from the table are significant only in 
the regressions using a fixed effect model except two, Cross-section Pooled Data and Panel Data, which 
are not significant in any regression at all.   
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6. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper, following in the footsteps of Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu, was to review 
the accumulated evidence on the impact of democracy on economic growth in the span of the last four 
decades. We tried to continue the work done by Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu by adding 35 new 
primary studies to 75 out of the 84 primary studies used in their meta-analysis. We applied meta-analysis 
and meta-regression analysis to the total pool of 110 studies with 1221 published estimates of the 
democracy-growth relationship and were able to draw one firm conclusion and another one less robust. 
First, we find no accumulated evidence of democracy being harmful to economic growth. Once we take 
all the data together the published evidence points to a zero direct effect on economic growth. This is in 
line with Bhagwati’s (1995) prediction that democracy does not hinder development. Second, while the 
direct effect is found to be zero, democracy seems to have significant indirect effects on growth through 
various channels. In particular, we find that democracy affects growth robustly through the channels of 
inequality and economic freedom. As democracy increases inequality decreases (probably through some 
kind of redistribution of wealth by the state) causing a decrease in the economic growth. As democracy 
increases economic freedom also increases (probably by reducing control of the economy by the state 
and allowing economic actors more freedom to act in their interests) causing an increase in the economic 
growth. We conclude that the net effect of democracy on economic growth is negligible. 
 
The data we collected from the 110 primary studies is enormous in size and still needs to be further 
analyzed. The residuals need to be used in order to eliminate several outliers before performing a meta-
analysis and an MRA on the remaining data sample. Sub-samples of the studies published before and 
after 2000 should be tested for robustness purposes. A sample only of studies including 10 models or 
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more each should be tested and the largest studies should also be tested separately. Also we should check 
for interactions and possible curvilinear relationships among our covariates and create sets of like 
covariates to test their impact as a group on the effect size of our democracy-growth relationship. We 
should perform a subgroup meta-analysis where we are going to create independent subgroups within 
studies and use the subgroup as the unit of analysis in order to mitigate the problem of statistical 
dependence that adversely affects our confidence intervals when we use the ALL SET sample. 
 
Only then we will be able to verify our main conclusion about the zero direct effect of democracy 
on growth and we will also be able to study the indirect effects more thoroughly and come to sounder 
and stronger final conclusions. 
 
Finally, we should keep in mind as a last caveat that the failure to find a statistically significant p-
value in meta-regression could mean that the effect (if any) is quite small, but could also mean that the 
analysis had poor power to detect even a large effect. One should never use a non-significant finding to 
conclude that a covariate (or a set of covariates) is not related to effect size. 
 
As for any further research on the democracy-growth relationship we suggest that data is collected 
from a group of countries that had dictatorships or authoritarian regimes in their recent history and now 
they have democracy for an extended period of time. Then the countries in the time periods when they 
had dictatorships should be used as a control group and the same countries under democracy at different 
times with different degrees of democracy should be used as a treatment group and then the effect size of 
democracy on growth should be calculated using a traditional t-test with ANOVA or SPSS.  
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7. Appendix I-Glossary of Terms 
 
Definitions/Explanations of Variables 
Following are the definitions or explanations of the variables used in the different studies included 
in the metaanalysis as explicitly or implicitly derived from the respective authors of those studies: 
 
Dependent Variables 
1. GDP per capita growth (WDI): Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on 
constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GDP per capita is 
gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of 
gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. 
2. GDP per capita growth (PWT): Real GDP using national-accounts growth rates, for studies 
comparing (output-based) growth rates across countries. 
3. GDP per capita growth (Maddison): Real GDP per capita. 
4. Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. growth (%): (1/t) ln (RGDP p.c. terminal year/ RGDP p.c. initial year) 
X 100 where t=number of increases of RGDP p.c. in the time period in question. 
5. Avg. Annual RGDP p.c. growth (%) PPP adjusted: (1/t) ln (RGDP p.c. terminal year/ RGDP p.c. 
initial year) X 100 where t=number of increases of RGDP p.c. in the time period in question and 
where RGDP is PPP adjusted. 
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Independent/Explanatory Variables 
1. GDP per capita (US$2000): GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear 
population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus 
any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is 
calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and 
degradation of natural resources. Data is in 2000 U.S. dollars. 
2. Ln GDP initial level/Ln Income p.c.: RGDP p.c. PPP adjusted. Unit: Log of per capita GDP in 
initial period/year dollars. 
3. Democracy Variable/Level/Index: Democracy is equivalent to Polity IV’s POLITY2 variable or 
Polity III’s operational indicator of democracy. 
4. Democracy Index: Gastil Index of political rights or Freedom House Index of Democracy. Unit: 
7 (autocracy) to 1(democracy). 
5. Democracy Score: Institutionalized Democracy Score. 
6. Democracy Dummy: Democracy dummy takes the value of 1 when there is a democratic system 
in a country in a given year and zero otherwise. 
7. Autocracy Score: Institutionalized Autocracy Score. 
8. Xrcomp: Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment. 
9. Pcomp:  Competitiveness of Political Participation. 
10. Xropen: Openness of Executive Recruitment. 
11. Xconst: Executive Constraints. 
12. Political Constraint: POLCONV is an index ranging from 0 (no constraints on executive’s 
powers) to 1 (full constraints on executive’s powers). 
Kyriakos J. Xafis 
125 
 
13. Transition/interregnum: Transitions/interregnums is a binary variable coded 1 if Polity IV’s 
POLITY2 is either -77 or -88, numerical codes used to represent transition or interregnum 
periods; and 0 otherwise. 
14. Democracy duration: Duration of democracy is the number of consecutive years for which 
POLITY2 is greater than zero. 
15. STARTDEMOC: It is the indicator of initial democratic capital. It is a dummy variable capturing 
the initial level of democracy (that is, the level of democracy in 1972). 
16. STARTPOL: It captures every country’s initial level of Gastil political rights (that is, in 1972). 
17. REGTYPE: It is a proxy for regime type. It is the average level of political rights, that is, the 
mean of the Gastil political rights series for the 1970s and 1980s. 
18. Q_REGTYPE: It is a quadratic specification of REGTYPE, aimed to capture nonlinearity effects 
in the relationship between growth and regime type. 
19. Foreign direct investment (% of GDP): 
20. Inflation Rate: Annual rate of change in CPI. Unit: %. 
21. Terms of trade change (%): The terms of trade change is computed based on the annual 
percentage change in the net barter terms of trade index created by the World Bank. 
22.  Terms of trade (%): Growth rate over each period of the ratio of export to import prices. 
23. Terms of trade shocks (%): Growth rate of export prices minus growth rate of import prices. 
24. Ln Life expectancy: The log of life expectancy at birth at the start of each period (as an indicator 
of health status). 
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25. Government/Public consumption (% of GDP): Government Final Consumption/GDP X 
100(usually excluding education and defense spending). Share of government consumption of 
goods and services in GDP, excluding transfers and public investment. 
26. Trade openness/share (%): Trade openness is measured by the sum of merchandise exports and 
imports divided by GDP X 100. 
27. Oil and gas production (% of GDP): Oil and gas production (% of GDP) is an approximate 
measure of the value of oil and gas production (US$2000) divided by GDP (US$2000) and taken 
from Ross’s (2013) oil and gas dataset. 
28. Oil Prices: World Oil Prices. 
29. Oil Exporter: Takes value 1if country is oil exporter. Unit: Dummy variable. 
30. Political violence: Political violence is the index of societal and interstate violence (ACTOTAL) 
from the Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV), which is the sum of societal and 
interstate violence scores in a country-year. This index ranges from 0 to 10, with a higher value 
indicating a greater degree of political violence. 
31. Political Instability: Number of revolutions and coups per year. 
32. INSTABILITY: It is a proxy for sociopolitical instability. Due to the practical difficulty of 
exactly assessing instability, the standard deviation of the Gastil political rights series is used. 
33. Former British colony: Dummy Variable equal to 1 if country was a British colony before its 
independence and 0 otherwise. 
34. Former French colony: Dummy Variable equal to 1 if country was a French colony before its 
independence and 0 otherwise. 
35. Ever a colony: Takes value 1if the country was ever a colony since 1776.Unit: Dummy variable. 
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36. Ethnolinguistic fractionalization: Probability that two randomly selected persons from a given 
country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group. Unit: Probability. 
37. Landlock: Landlock is a binary variable coded 1 if a given country is landlocked; and 0 
otherwise. Unit: Dummy variable. 
38. Tropical: Tropics captures the approximate percentage of a given country’s land area in 
geographical tropics and derives from Gallup et al.’s (1999) dataset, while its coverage was 
expanded by manually imputing values for Comoros, Cape Verde, and Mauritius. 
39. Aid/GNI (%): Aid/GNI refers to the fraction of net ODA in GNI (%) and is taken from the WDI. 
40. Population/Ln Fertility Rate: Population Growth Rate of total population. 
41. Population under 15: Percent of population 15 and under. Unit: %. 
42. Population over 65: Percent of population 65 and over. Unit: %. 
43. Human Capital: Secondary school enrollment rate. 
44. Human Capital: Average years of secondary and higher education in the population over age 25. 
45. Male Schooling: Male average years of attainment in secondary and higher schools for the adult 
population at the start of each period. 
46. Female Schooling: Female average years of attainment in secondary and higher schools for the 
adult population at the start of each period. 
47. Ln (GDP)*human capital: An interaction between the log of initial GDP and an overall human 
capital variable. Overall human capital is the sum of the levels of male and female school 
attainment and the log of life expectancy, where each variable is multiplied by its coefficient in 
the regression. 
48. Public educational spending ratio: The ratio of public educational spending to GDP. 
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49. SGCREDIT: The standard deviation of the growth of domestic credit. 
50. Black Market Premium: Difference between black market exchange rate and official exchange 
rate, divided by the official rate. Unit: % 
51. Rule of Law Index: The rule-of-law index (measured on a 0 to 6 scale, with 6 the most favorable) 
is one of several subjective country indexes prepared for fee-paying international investors by 
International Country Risk Guide. 
52. Investment Ratio/Rate: The period-average investment ratio. Rate of physical capital investment. 
Unit: % GDP. 
53. Income Inequality: Gini coefficient. Unit: (%). 
54. Muslim: Takes value 1if majoritarian religion is Muslim. Unit: Dummy variables taking the 
values 0 or 1. 
55. Catholic: Takes value 1if majoritarian religion is Catholicism. Unit: Dummy variables taking the 
values 0 or 1. 
56. Other Christian: Takes value 1if majoritarian religion is Christian, but not Catholicism. Unit: 
Dummy variables taking the values 0 or 1. 
57. Confucian: Takes value 1if majoritarian religion is Buddhism, Xintoism, Confucianism, etc. 
(excludes Hindu). Unit: Dummy variables taking the values 0 or 1. 
58. War casualties: War casualties per capita. Unit: Ratio. 
59. Postwar Independence: Takes value 1if country gained independence after the Second World 
War. Unit: Dummy variable. 
60. Log area: Area. Unit: Logarithm of area in square kilometers. 
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61. Log distance: Average distance to the capitals to the world's 20 major exporters, weighted by the 
volume of bilateral imports. Unit: Thousands of kilometers. 
62. ECONFREE: It is a 1-to-10 index scale. A score of 1 indicates the lowest average level of 
economic freedom and a score of 10 the highest level, in the sample period. 
63. Q_ECONFREE: It is a quadratic specification of ECONFREE, aimed to capture nonlinearity 
effects in the relationship between growth and economic freedom. 
64. LOWHUMCAP: Low-level human capital is the percentage of the total population that achieved 
basic schooling. 
65. HIGHHUMCAP: High-level human capital is the percentage of the total population that 
achieved higher schooling (formal education at college level and beyond). 
66. SUB-SAHAFRICA: Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy. 
67. LATAMERICA-CARIB: Latin America and the Caribbean Dummy. 
68. NTHAFRICA-MIDEAST: North Africa and the Middle East Dummy. 
69. ASIA-PACIFIC: Asia and the Pacific region Dummy. 
70. NTHAMERICA-EUROPE: North America and Europe Dummy, where most OECD countries 
are located. 
71. Market: It is a random variable that ranges between the values 1-3 from non-market to free 
market economy. 
72. Development: It is measured by the level of PQLI as an indicator of economic well-being. 
73. Culture: Dummy variable taking the value of 1 for cultural tradition tolerant of diversity, conflict, 
and compromise and 0 for cultural tradition conducive to hierarchical relationships and extreme 
reference to authority. 
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74. Education: It measures educational expenditure as a percentage of total public expenditure. 
75. LAW: Reflects the degree to which the citizens of a country are willing to accept the established 
institutions to make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes. It also measures the extent to 
which countries have sound political institutions, strong courts, and orderly succession of 
powers. 
76. REPUDCON: Measures the risk of a modification in a contract taking the form of repudiation, 
postponement, or scaling down because of budget cutbacks, indigenization pressure, a change in 
government, or a change in government economic and social priorities. 
77. EXPRISK: Measures the risks associated with outright confiscation and forced nationalization of 
private property. 
78. BURQUALIT: Reflects the competency and the professionalism of government bureaucrats and 
the government employees who are recruited and promoted by merit rather than political loyalty. 
It measures autonomy from political pressure, strength, and expertise to govern without drastic 
changes in policy or interruptions in government services. 
79. BURDEL: Measures the efficiency and the quality of government bureaucracy. 
80. CORRUPTION: Measures the extent to which high government officials are likely to demand 
special payments. 
81. CONENF: Measures the extent to which contracts are enforced and claims are legally 
adjudicated. 
82. INFQUAL: Measures the quality of infrastructure. 
83. NATRISK: Measures the risk of forced nationalization of private property. 
84. Property rights index: A rating of property rights in each country (on a scale from 1 to 5). 
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85. Business regulation index: a rating of regulation policies related to opening a business and 
keeping open a business (on a scale from 1 to 5). 
86. Legal origin: identifies the legal origin of the Company Law or Commercial Code of each 
country. 
87. Religion: identifies the percentage of the population of each country that belonged to the three 
most widespread religions in the world in 1980. 
88. Latitude: the absolute value of the latitude of the country, scaled to take values between 0 and 1. 
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8. Appendix II-Technical Appendix 
In this technical appendix we are going to describe the reporting protocols used in the research and 
analysis process that led to the writing of this paper. These reporting protocols are based on the 
recommendations of the Meta-Analysis of Economics Research Network (MAER-Net). 
 
Research Question and Effect Size 
The question that prompted this research was if there is a relationship between democracy and 
economic growth, which is conclusive, based on the published literature up to now. 
In order to answer this question we decided to use the partial correlation of democracy (the 
independent variable of interest from the original primary study regressions) on growth (the dependent 
variable of interest from the original primary study regressions) as the measure for the effect size to be 
tested. The partial correlation coefficients are calculated by using the t-statistics reported in the primary 
studies. Where t-statistics are not reported, they can be approximated from the reported levels of 
statistical significance, or from the reported regression coefficients and standard errors. The formula 
used to calculate partial correlations is: t/√(t2+df) where t is the t-statistic and df is degrees of freedom. 
Where degrees of freedom where not reported they were calculated using the formula: df=n-k-1 where n 
is the number of observations included in the regression and k the number of variables. Note that this 
calculation for the partial correlation will always produce a positive number, so it is necessary to convert 
it to a negative number if the regression coefficient is negative (see Greene 2000, chapter 6). What we 
did was to convert the t-value when it was reported as an absolute value into a signed value based on the 
sign of the regression coefficient and then calculate the correlation using the above formula. For a 
detailed analysis of the calculations see the excel file named “metaanalysis data”. It is important that a 
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standardized measure of an effect is used. In our case we entered the effect sizes of our primary studies 
in the CMA85 software which proceeded in transforming them to a Fisher’s Z score and then back to a 
partial correlation for programming reasons. The effects where standardized automatically in the 
software when the data was entered by the use of the following formula: ε=∑[Niεi]/∑Ni where ε is the 
standardized effect, εi is the effect size in our case partial correlation from the ith study that was 
introduced in the software and transformed into a Fisher’s Z score and N is the associated weight. For 
the random effects model the associated weight was the inverse of the total variance for each study, 
which is the sum of its variance with the between-studies variance. For the fixed effects model the 
associated weight was the sample size of each study. 
 
Research Literature Searching, Compilation and Coding 
The search for the literature was done in Google Scholar and in Google Search engine and also in 
the following databases through the portal of the University of Macedonia’s library: Science Direct, 
ABI/Inform Collection-ProQuest, Wiley Interscience, JSTOR, EBSCOhost, and MPSA. The precise 
combination of keywords employed for the search was: “Democracy and Growth” and “Democracy and 
Economic Growth” both in quotes and without quotes. The search started in the spring of 2017 around 
March and ended in the summer of 2018 around August.  
 Meta-analysis requires the identification of primary studies and the coding of information from 
them. Therefore, a comprehensive search of relevant databases, analysis of citations and careful study of 
references in order to identify as many studies as possible was done. The rules for study inclusion were 
the following: 1) All studies of the Doucouliagos-Ulubasoglu collection that were available, 2) All 
studies having as their primary focus the investigation of the democracy-growth relationship, 3) From 
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those studies only the ones that used econometric methodologies to analyze their empirical findings and 
reported them, 4) The next step in narrowing the sample of studies was to include only those that had 
economic growth as a dependent variable and democracy as one of the independent variables, and 5) 
Only those studies that were published in a scientific-social journal or were presented in a public forum 
like the U.N. 
Following the above rules of inclusion we included 110 studies out of 169 that were thoroughly 
examined. Most of the 59 studies that were excluded violated either the second or the third rule of 
inclusion or both while the rest violated one of the other rules. A thorough list with descriptions of the 
110 studies included in our meta-analysis is available in Table 1 in the Literature Review section of our 
paper. Also a complete list of the information coded for each study in the form of binary and continuous 
covariates along with detailed descriptions is available in Table 2 in the Data Analysis section of our 
paper. 
The author of this paper, Kyriakos J. Xafis, is the only researcher who searched, read, and coded 
the research literature and is solely responsible for any mistakes herein. The MAER-Net protocol of 
using at least two reviewers to code the research literature was not followed because this work was done 
as part of a Master’s Thesis preparation. 
 
MRA Modeling Issues  
The meta-regression model (known as MRA) has been developed to analyze the multi-dimensional 
nature of the research process (Stanley and Jarrell 1998). The impact of specification, data and 
methodological differences can be investigated by estimating an MRA of the following (linear) form:  
εi=α+γ1Xi1+…+ γkXik+ δ1Ki1+…+ δnKin+ui  (1) 
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where εi is the standardized effect derived from the ith study (in our study we use the partial correlation), 
α is the constant term, Xj are dummy variables representing characteristics associated with the ith study, 
Kj are continuous variables associated with the ith study, γ and δ are the unknown regression coefficients, 
and ui is the disturbance term, with usual Gaussian error properties.  
Equation (1) is a fixed effects model MRA and assumes that variation in εi can be explained by sampling 
error and systematic differences between studies (the X and K study characteristics variables).  
The random effects version of the MRA is given by:  
εi=α+γ1Xi1+…+ γkXik+ δ1Ki1+…+ δnKin+ui+ei  (2) 
Equation (2) assumes that in addition to sampling error, the source of some of the variation in εi is due to 
random differences among studies that cannot be identified. The regression coefficients in (1) and (2) 
quantify the impact of specification, data and methodological differences on reported study effects (εi).  
It is recommended that both fixed effects and random effects models be estimated (see Hunter and 
Schmidt 2004) and we do so for two different study samples the ALL SET and the BEST SET. 
Funnel graphs and scatterplots are used to present the analysis of our data sets. The funnel plot is a 
scatter of the standardized effects and a measure of precision (sample size or standard errors). The funnel 
plot offers three important pieces of information. (a) The more symmetrical the plot the more 
representative is the observed distribution of findings and confidence with descriptive statistics is 
increased. (b) The funnel plot shows the degree to which empirical results converge towards one 
underlying population effect and the extent to which the literature has reported heterogeneous findings. 
(c) The center of a symmetrical funnel plot is an unbiased estimate of the underlying population effect. 
Arranging the estimates in a chronological order or by sample size and plotting these in a forest plot 
informs on whether the findings are stable over time and whether structural breaks have occurred or 
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whether the findings depend on sample size or not. Forest plots were estimated and are described but not 
presented in our paper due to the big number of studies included in our data sets, which makes it difficult 
if not impossible to show the forest plots without messing up the scales. A thorough investigation of 
publication bias was done for both data sets fully described in the results section of the current paper. 
It is a good idea to check the sensitivity and robustness of the MRA. Examples of such testing 
include: (a) comparison of fixed effects and random effects models; (b) removing the largest and 
smallest estimates; (c) using only those studies that the analysts regard as superior according to some 
criterion (e.g. published in leading journals or used a particular estimation procedure). In our analysis we 
performed a comparison of fixed and random effects models. Four FE models and four RE models were 
estimated for the two data sets with different combinations of the 40 covariates used in total in our 
analysis. The weaknesses of our analysis and suggestions for further analysis of our data are fully 
disclosed in the conclusion of this paper.    
Descriptive statistics were calculated for all studies but were not reported in our paper for  
saving space. All calculations, results, tables, graphs, and formulas are available in the files ALL 
SET.cma, BEST SET.cma, ALL SET.cmr, and BEST SET.cmr.  All of the techniques listed in this 
technical appendix can be performed with CMA. Other options include Metawin and Stata. However, if 
one wishes to verify our results and reproduce our analysis without starting from the beginning he should 
use the Comprehensive Meta-analysis version 3software package that we used.
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9. Notes 
1. “Democracy and Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 
52, No. 1, January 2008, Pp. 61–83 
2. Useful reviews of the empirical literature can be found in Alesina and Perotti (1994), Aron (2000), 
Przeworksi and Limongi (1993), and Sirowy and Inkeles (1990). Summaries of the theoretical 
debates can be found in Baumand Lake (2003), deHaan and Siermann (1995a), Gasiorowski (2000), 
Kurzman, Werum, and Burkhart (2002), and Quinn and Woolley (2001), among others. 
3. Partial correlations are changed into Fisher’s Z scores for technical reasons of the CMA software in 
order to perform the MRA and they are reported as such in the MRA results section of this paper. 
4. This correction becomes perfect as the number of studies approaches infinity. 
5. Traditional qualitative reviews cannot filter such effects, which are subject to “methodological 
speculation” (Stanley 2001). 
6. Less Developed Countries 
7. Foreign Direct Investment 
8. Sub-Saharan Africa 
9. Pooled Ordinary Least Squares 
10. Random Effects-Generalized Least Squares 
11. Fixed Effects-Ordinary Least Squares 
12. Gross Domestic Product per capita 
13. World Development Index 
14. Penn World Table 
15. Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 
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16. Gross National Income 
17. Middle East North Africa 
18. Generalized Method of Moments 
19. Average 
20. Real Gross Domestic Product 
21. National Gross Domestic Product 
22. Instrumental Variables 
23. Three Stage Least Squares 
24. Structural Equation Modeling 
25. Seemingly Unrelated Regressions 
26. Purchasing Power Parity 
27. Autoregressive Model 
28. Probability 
29. Hahn-Hausman-Kuersteiner 
30. Total Factor Productivity 
31. Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
32. Simulated Generalized Method of Moments 
33. Non-Corruption Index 
34. Global Financial Crisis 
35. Weighted Least Squares 
36. Standard Deviation 
37. Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
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38. Augmented Dicky Fuller 
39. Autoregressive-Distributed Lag 
40. Error Correction Model 
41. Vector Error Correction Model 
42. Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares 
43. Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares 
44. Freedom House 
45. Anderson-Hsiao 
46. Commonwealth of Independent States 
47. Democracy 
48. Support Vector Machines Democracy Index 
49. Gross National Product 
50. Robust Regression 
51. Intelligence Quotient 
52. Central and Eastern European 
53. Former Soviet Union 
54. Thousands 
55. Year 
56. Two Stage Least Squares 
57. International Country Risk Guide 
58. Business Environment Risk Intelligence 
59. Central Francophone Africa 
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60. Estimated Generalized Least Squares 
61. Human Development Index 
62. Physical Quality of Life Index 
63. Cross-section 
64. Time Series Cross-section 
65. Cumulative Distribution Function 
66. Latin America 
67. Rainfall 
68. Capital Flows 
69. Other Capital Flows 
70. Terms of Trade 
71. Disparity Reduction Rate 
72. Franc-Zone Africa 
73. Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
74. Economic Turmoil in Media Index 
75. Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes 
76. Partial correlations can be calculated directly from regression output. See Greene (2000, 234) for 
details. Different factors are held constant in different studies, contributing to the heterogeneity of 
the results. We control for this through meta-regression analysis. 
77. The scale is in Fisher Z score units and not in partial correlation units. 
78. The tendency in the early literature to provide detailed country compositions has been abandoned in 
recent years, resulting in loss of data points in the MRA. 
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79. Note that the variable Region indicates whether researchers include a regional dummy in their 
regressions or not, while the variables Latin America, Asia, and Africa mentioned above indicate 
whether the samples of the studies include countries from those continents (regardless of whether a 
regional dummy is used in the regressions or not). 
80. This information can be collected from footnotes in the original studies. 
81. Binary Variable. 
82. By “constructed” studies here we refer to the 1221 data points in the MRA, which we consider as 
statistically independent studies for our purposes although we know that they are not. 
83. The publication bias analysis is done only for the fixed effects model since this is the model of 
interest for the ALL SET and since the analysis for the random effects model is for the most part 
similar. 
84. By subgroup membership we mean the value of 1 or 0 that each study takes for each one of the 
categorical covariates or the magnitude of the number value that each study takes for each one of the 
continuous covariates. 
85. Comprehensive Meta-analysis software package. 
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